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Abstract 
 
This is a comparative study, which sheds light on an important, and yet less explored 
topic of torts in construction law in the Sudan. 
Chapter one dealt with the nature of construction industry and construction contracts. 
The parties to construction contracts were identified and their various roles were 
explained. The special nature and classification of construction contracts were pointed 
out together with examples of prominent standard forms.   
Chapter two discussed the most important torts in construction. The discussion 
elaborated on judicial precedents and statutory rules, which illustrate the approach to 
torts from the perspective of construction. Issues related to causation, damages and 
proof of loss were, also, discussed. 
Chapter three discussed joint and vicarious liability in addition to employer’s strict 
liability for injury to employees in construction projects. The discussion, also, covered 
the important issue of liability of the project owner for acts of independent 
contractors. 
Chapter four summed up the findings and recommendations for reform of Sudanese 
law in the field of tortuous liability of parties to construction contracts. 
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 اﻟﺨﻼﺻﺔ
 
ﺗﻬﺪف هﺬﻩ اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ إﻟﻰ إﻟﻘﺎء اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻘﺼﻴﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻲ 
  . اﻟﺒﺤﻮث ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ أهﻤﻴﺘﻪوهﻮ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺗﻘﻞ
ﻧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﺹﻨﺎﻋﺔ وﻋﻘﻮد اﻟﺘﺸﻴﻴﺪ وﻋﺮف آﺬﻟﻚ أﻃﺮاف ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻌﻘﻮد وﺷﺮح 
أﺷﺎر اﻟﻔﺼﻞ أﻳﻀﺎ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺘﺼﻨﻴﻒ واﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﺨﺎﺹﺔ ﻟﻌﻘﻮد اﻟﺘﺸﻴﻴﺪ آﻤﺎ أورد . أدوارهﻢ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ
  .أﻣﺜﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻤﺎذج اﻟﻤﺸﻬﻮرة اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﻓﻲ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻌﻘﻮد
ﺜﺎﻧﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻘﺼﻴﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﺸﻴﻴﺪ وﻗﺪ أﺳﻬﺒﺖ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻗﺸﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻨﺎول اﻟﺴﻮاﺏﻖ ﻧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟ
اﻟﻘﻀﺎﺉﻴﺔ واﻟﻘﻮاﻋﺪ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻮﺿﺢ آﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﻨﺎول اﻟﻤﻮاﺿﻴﻊ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺏﺎﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻘﺼﻴﺮﻳﺔ 
  . آﻤﺎ ﺗﻢ ﺗﻨﺎول اﻟﻤﻮاﺿﻴﻊ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺏﺎﻟﺴﺒﺒﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻌﻮﻳﺾ واﺙﺒﺎت اﻟﻀﺮر. ﻣﻦ ﻣﻨﻈﻮر اﻟﺘﺸﻴﻴﺪ
ﺜﺎﻟﺚ اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮآﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ أﻓﻌﺎل اﻟﻐﻴﺮ ﺏﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻄﻠﻘﺔ ﻧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟ
ﻏﻄﺖ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻗﺸﺔ آﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻚ ﻋﻦ أﻓﻌﺎل . ﻟﻤﺎﻟﻚ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوع ﻋﻦ اﻷذى اﻟﺬي ﻳﻠﺤﻖ ﺏﺎﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ
  .اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ ﺡﻴﺚ أﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻮاﺿﻴﻊ ذات اﻷهﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﻜﺒﻴﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل اﻟﺘﺸﻴﻴﺪ
ﻊ اﻟﺤﻴﺜﻴﺎت واﻟﺘﻮﺹﻴﺎت ﻻﺹﻼح اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﺨﺺ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺏ
  .اﻟﺘﻘﺼﻴﺮﻳﺔ ﻷﻃﺮاف ﻋﻘﻮد اﻟﺘﺸﻴﻴﺪ
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Preface 
 
There has been increasing investment related to construction in recent years and there 
is great hope that the coming few years will witness even more development in 
construction projects in the Sudan. Thus, the study and reform of Sudanese law to 
cope with the new developments in this business have become a great necessity.  
Tortious liability, in particular, is a sensitive issue which needs special attention 
during the performance of construction contracts.  
The reason for comparison between Sudanese law and Anglo-Saxon laws is that the 
latter are developed in the area of construction and hence they can be a good example 
for comparison and emulation for Sudanese law.  
The existing statutory and judicial precedents on tort, in the Sudan, need to be 
carefully reconciled with the universal needs of construction. Study and comparison 
with international legal approach to construction issues is, also, important in this age 
of globalization of industries and legal rules. 
 It is appropriate, in this context to quote from an article published for Professor 
David L. Perrott in the Sudan Law Journal and Reports in 1961 where he stated that: 
(Sudanese courts have indeed gone even further, and where there is no express 
Sudanese provision on a topic, have taken over relevant English statutes in their 
entirety, and applied them as common law of the Sudan.) 
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Chapter 1 
 
Nature of construction 
Industry & construction contracts 
 
1. Introduction: 
Construction industry includes a wide range of fields, prominent examples of which 
are civil engineering works and building structure, but, generally speaking, 
construction ranges from construction of power stations, factories, chemical plants, 
roads, bridges to shipbuilding and satellite construction.  
However, the description mentioned here is by no means a limitation to the sectors of 
this industry, which keeps developing and expanding continuously with the 
development of relevant sciences and needs. 
Construction projects are unique and they entail great care about the various 
complexities, uncertainties and risks that the parties might encounter during the 
execution of various projects. 
In order to cater for its own requirements construction industry has worked out its 
own very particular forms of contracts and project management techniques which in 
turn have framed the whole legal approach to issues relating to construction.  
The special contract forms thus created have to accommodate clauses that necessarily 
deal with other liabilities, which could arise as a result of the performance of 
contractual obligations by the parties. Matters at issue in this context are those related 
to tortious liability.   
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Many torts could arise during the performance of construction contracts such as 
negligence, trespass, nuisance, etc. but the nature and liability for them cannot be 
perceived without considering the special nature of construction contracts i.e. more 
specific understanding needs to be adopted for the application of the principles of the 
law of torts to construction cases. 
Tortious liability in the course of the performance of a 
contract has been recognized in Sudanese law, 
though not for the first time, in the case of Mahdi 
Abdul Hamid Al Mahdi vs. Sudan Railways 
Corporation1 where it was held that a party suffering 
from damage by reason of breach of contract is not 
precluded from claiming damages in tort against the 
party in breach if he has cause of action for such 
claim.  
It was concluded that proof of such tortious liability would not be affected by the fact 
that the original relationship between the parties was a contractual one. According to 
the rule in the mentioned case it is recognized law in the Sudan that any party is under 
implied obligation not to commit any act, which causes danger to the other party’s 
safety or property.  This rule clearly refers to legal obligations of the parties as 
opposed to contractual obligation, which, in fact, is the basis of tortios liability. 
                                                 
1 SLJR 1978 p. 59 
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As far as legislation in the Sudan is concerned the Sudanese Civil Transactions Act 
1984 further provides for liability of the contractor for damage caused by negligent 
acts in addition to any other acts that might be committed by him or her in the course 
of performance of the contract. Section 384 reads as follows:    
“The contractor shall pay compensation for any loss or damage arising from his acts 
or work, whether intentional, negligent or otherwise. Compensation shall not be 
payable if such loss or damage is a consequence of an unavoidable event.” 
 
 
 
2. Characteristics of Construction Industry: 
For the sake of conciseness the following points can be made to indicate some of 
the key areas, which are common to those who deal with construction. 
i) Civil Engineering:   
Civil engineering involves works, which are related to infrastructure; i.e. 
roads, tunnels, bridges, harbours, water supply, sewers and power stations. 
Civil engineering projects, usually, need high capital value and take long 
time to complete. 
ii) Building: 
Building works are concerned with the construction of commercial and domestic 
buildings. For the building sector it is very important to give all the details of the 
building, its services and finishes. 
iii) Other Categories: 
Without limitation, an illustration of these can be construction of factories, 
chemical plants, shipbuilding and demolition. 
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iv) Parties Involved In Construction: 
There are so many relationships, which are created by construction contracts. The 
parties involved in a construction project, usually, include the owner of the property; 
architects, engineers, and consultants. In most cases such contracts include banks and 
financial institutions, which advance money to fund the purchase of the property or 
the construction of the property. 
Rights and duties of parties in construction contracts intersect in a circle that contains 
the general contractor, subcontractors, suppliers and their sales representatives e.t.c. 
For the ease of reference the parties to construction projects can be grouped into the 
following three categories, namely; owners, consultants and contractors.  
a) The Owner:  
The party who promotes or commissions the construction project is generally referred 
to as the owner in construction contracts but in some cases the same party is called the 
client, the employer, the purchaser or the promoter. That is because, generally, this 
party is the owner of the subject matter of the construction. 
The duties of the owner of the property under the contract and under the law, in 
general, start by performance of a variety of pre-construction tasks. An owner is 
obligated to obtain required licenses and permits from competent government 
authorities. Failure to undertake necessary inspections or tests or obtain all approvals 
might entail liability of the owner to parties who might be affected by such failure. It 
is common to see in construction contracts a reference to observance of statutory 
obligations breach of which, as we will discuss later, might lead to tortious liability, 
as well. 
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The owner is under a duty to warn persons who will be exposed to dangers in the site 
of the dangerous condition, which exist there. Thus, from the perspective of the law of 
torts, the owner owes a duty to persons who will either be exposed to the danger or 
are likely to face liability for injuries and losses arising out of the dangerous 
condition. 
 In current construction practice an owner would attempt to discharge his duty to warn 
and inform about site conditions by conducting what is known as a walk-through with 
workers and contractors. A walk-through is literally a presentation and inspection by 
the owner of a construction site before any work is done. The purpose of a Walk-
through is to familiarize and acclimatize the workers and contractors with site 
conditions and to warn them of possible dangers.  
b) The Consultant: 
The parties who give advice on the construction project are referred to as consultants; 
they can be architects, engineers or surveyors. The brief or agreement defines the 
scope of responsibility for the consultant. The normal obligation on consultants would 
require them to carry out their services with reasonable skill and care. 
c) The Contractor: 
Contractors are the parties who take the responsibility for the physical construction of 
the works. Their scope of work used to be the execution of the construction works, 
only, but recently it expanded to the designing and building activities, as well. 
The general contractor is responsible for coordinating the construction work and its 
completion according to the terms and conditions of the contract. In contracts, which 
involve large construction projects, a general contractor would hire subcontractors to 
perform particular tasks within the general scope of work of the main contract. 
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Typical subcontractors in the construction business include electricians, plumbers, 
excavators, carpenters, and manufacturers of building materials. 
 
3. Characteristics Of Construction Law And Construction 
Contracts: 
i) Construction Contracts:  
a) Definition Of Construction Contracts: 
Construction contracts are treated according to the general rules of the law of contract 
but statutory rules could have great impact on the formation and the performance of 
such contracts.  
In Sudanese law there is no definition of a construction contract as such. The only 
related provision to this subject can be found in The Civil Transaction Act 1984 Part 
XII, which deals with Contract of Works and Civil Engineering Contracts. Section 
378 of The Civil Transactions Act 1984 defines the Contract for Works as follows: 
“By a contract for works one of the contracting parties undertakes to manufacture 
something or to perform a service in consideration of remuneration which the other 
contracting party undertakes to pay.” It is clear that such definition can extend to 
other engineering contracts and it cannot be seen as particular to construction 
contracts. 
The position in English law is different where specific reference is made to 
construction contracts in the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996 (HGCR). Section 104(1) of the Act defines a "construction contract" as an 
agreement for: 
? Carrying out construction operations;  
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? Arranging for the carrying out construction operations by 
others under a subcontract or otherwise;  
? Providing one's own labour or the labour of others for the 
carrying out of construction operations.  
It is clear from Section 104(1) that the term "construction contract" is not only 
confined to the meaning of an ordinary contract under the general principles of the 
law of contract i.e. it is not confined to the ingredients of an enforceable contract, like 
capacity, intention to create legal relations, consideration e.t.c. It should also be 
considered whether or not there may be an agreement for the purposes of Section 104 
of the Act and not only for the purposes of mere formation of a contract.  
Section 104(2) of the Act provides that reference to a construction contract, also, 
includes agreements to do architectural, design or surveying work and to provide 
advice on building, engineering, interior or exterior decoration or the laying out of 
landscaping, in relation to construction operations.  
ii) Construction Law: 
Identifying the boundaries of construction law is a difficult task because this branch 
of law is comprised of so many traditional legal topics, including contracts, torts, 
insurance, surety ship and property law, e.t.c.  
Construction law is also derived from the agreements made by the various parties to a 
construction contracts as well as . Rules set out in judicial decisions or by 
governmental agencies also affect construction law such as the rules governing health, 
environment and municipal regulations. 
a) Classification of Construction Contracts:  
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Construction contracts can be classified into three categories. The first traditional 
form of which is the build-only contracts. In the mentioned category the contractor is 
only responsible for the execution of the design. Principal types of contracts within 
this category can be classified in terms of payment mode as; the lump sum or fixed 
price contracts in which the contractor agrees to complete the whole work for a 
specific sum of money. But nevertheless those contracts can provide for a schedule of 
rates or bill of quantities that can be used to value change orders. 
The second type of contracts in the traditional form are known as measure and value 
or re-measurement contracts. In this type of contracts the actual completed work is 
measured at completion and valued according to the rates, which are set out in the bill 
of quantities. The third type is known as Cost plus contracts or  “Fixed Free Contract” 
where the contractor is paid the actual cost for the work. Predetermined description of 
cost can be used in this type together with an agreed fixed fee, often called a 
percentage.  
The second category of construction contracts is the non-traditional form that is 
described as the design and build contracts, often called “package deal contracts”. In 
that sort of contracts the contractor performs and assumes responsibility for both the 
design and the construction as well.  
The third non-traditional category is design, build, operate and transfer or Turn-key 
Contracts. The mentioned contracts, also, introduce more responsibilities for the 
contractor so that he becomes responsible for operation and transference of the 
project, as well. 
b) FIDIC Contracts: 
It is also common to find other more complex standard contract forms, which address 
different construction needs. Some of the well-known and widely used contract forms 
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are those known as FIDIC contracts. FIDIC is an abbreviation of the French title of 
the international federation of engineers and consultants, “Fédération Internationale 
des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC)”. FIDIC has developed model standard form 
contracts for use in the international construction industry. They are commonly 
referred to as FIDIC contracts. 
In September 1998, FIDIC published four new or revised standard form contracts 
comprising new editions of two existing forms. The forms are the Red Book, the 
Yellow Book, the Silver Book and the Green Book. Each of the mentioned books 
deals with a particular form of construction agreement. 
The Red Book (fourth edition) deals with civil engineering works and the Yellow 
Book (third edition) with electrical and mechanical works in both instances, the 
employer and/or the engineer either supplied the design or played a central role in 
producing it.  
FIDIC prepared the Orange Book (first edition) to provide a contract where the 
contractor supplied the design and took single-point completion responsibility. The 
Orange Book, unlike the old Red and Yellow Books, contemplates the use of an 
employer's representative and does not use the term "Engineer".  
The Silver Book is intended to deal with a turnkey contract where the contractor takes 
responsibility for design and the contract is on a strictly two-party basis; that is to say 
there is no intermediary such as the engineer. 
c) Sudanese Standard Construction Contract Forms: 
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In 1999, a national Sudanese technical committee was established in order to draft 
Sudanese standard construction contract terms and conditions. The committee 
comprised renowned engineering bodies as well as some lawyers who are experienced 
in the construction field. The standard contract focused on general terms and 
conditions. 
iii) Functions of Construction Contracts:   
The function of construction contracts is to provide a mechanism to control the 
work and regulate it in case a variety of speculated occurrences should happen, an 
example of this can be the variance of designs, alteration of the construction 
program, extra payments and extension of time. The risks, which the parties 
assume, must, also, be provided for in the contract. 
The most important determinant of success for any construction contract is its 
mechanism and policy for risk management and claims avoidance.  
iv) Subcontracts: 
The use of subcontractors to execute parts of the construction work is one of 
the most prominent features of construction industry. It is quite usual to find 
that the main contract is providing certain agreed conditions and warranties to 
be included in the subcontract. 
It is also a prominent feature in construction to encounter different forms of 
joint ventures, whether with regard to the subcontractors or the main 
contractors to the project. The purposes for using joint ventures in construction 
can be so many but principally there are two purposes.  
Firstly, they can be formed at the request of the employer for the purpose of 
sharing expertise and transfer of technology; examples of this are common in 
major construction projects owned by governments in developing countries. 
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Secondly, they can, also, be formed for the purposes of sharing the risk and 
responsibility or creating long term relationship. 
v) Conclusion: 
From the brief description of construction industry and the complex nature of 
factors leading to the execution of construction projects it can be clear that a 
construction contract, however comprehensive it might be, can never guard 
against all eventualities in the construction reality. 
The bulk of manpower used in construction contracts is usually big and the 
physical area affected, in most cases is a large one, therefore, during the execution 
of construction works the effects of a particular incident or activity can extend to a 
big number of parties or third parties. 
Construction activities involve a large degree of interaction and interrelations 
whether between the parties to the contracts and subcontracts or towards third 
parties, at large.  
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CHAPTER 2 
The Law of Torts in Construction 
 
1. Introduction:  
This chapter deals with some of the most common torts in construction as well as 
damages for breach of tortious liability.  
Winfield defines tortious liability as follows: 2 
 “Tortious liability arises from a breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; this duty is 
towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for un-liquidated 
damages.” 
The definition has two main ingredients, the first one shows the difference between 
contract and tort i.e. a duty primarily fixed by law, which literally means that a party 
is under a duty in tort because the law says so and not because the party has agreed to 
                                                 
2 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (11th ) edition 1979, p. 3. 
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it. The second ingredient shows that a duty in tort is towards persons in general 
which, also, shows the contrast with the duty under contract, which is owed to a 
specific person or persons by agreement of the parties. 
The scope of this definition would help to explain how the performance of a 
construction contract could create much wider liability for the parties than they 
primarily might have considered, at the time of the formation of their contract.   
Torts play a very important role in construction and it is, therefore, very significant 
for parties to construction contracts to consider all issues related to anticipated torts. 
Consideration of anticipated torts is vital to the framing of the final agreement 
between the parties with regard to, for example, the assessment of cost, work plan, 
and required insurance coverage of risks, in case they wish to provide any. 
With the development of legislation and legal obligations relating to construction 
great efforts are required to envisage all the expected scenarios that might give rise to 
tortious liability.  
Although it is possible to see the position of Sudanese law in some cases with regard 
to tortious liability, in general, but it is not, always, easy to see the same in relation to 
construction. 
2. Some Torts in Construction: 
i) Negligence:  
The tort of negligence is considered to be of high importance in construction due to 
the fact that the high standard of care and skill required in construction cannot, 
always, be attained. However, many other torts are, on occasion, of relative 
importance and the parties should be aware of them. 
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Winfield defines the tort of negligence as “a breach of a legal duty to take care, which 
results in damage undesired by the defendant to the plaintiff.3”  
It has three ingredients, which are:  
? Legal duty on the part of A towards B to exercise care in such 
conduct of A as falls within the scope of the duty.  
? Breach of that duty. 
? Consequential damage to B.” 
The first ingredient of the tort of negligence which, is the duty of care on the part of 
the plaintiff towards the defendant, needs special focus, as a person might not be held 
responsible for any careless act if it cannot be proven that he owes a duty of care to 
the defendant.  
The particular nature of construction raises questions as to the scope of the duty of 
care in negligent acts leading to physical damage in construction sites. However, for 
an owner or a construction contractor, it is worthwhile to have, in place, a contract 
policy for as much site precautions as possible to limit the range of the duty of care 
towards potential defendants. 
The second ingredient of the tort of negligence concerns breach of duty. The 
circumstances of breach of duty of care are decided upon according to the reasonable 
man test, which was explained in a dictum made by Alderson B. in the English case 
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Company as follows4: 
"The reasonable man test in construction torts has to be qualified by the particular 
nature of the industry. What a reasonable man in the industry would do or would not 
do is what matters when it comes to applying the test."  
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a) Damage related to negligent act: 
In construction, the property to which damage occurs could be characterized by two 
distinctions; firstly; it might be property, which, exists independently of the defendant 
or, secondly; it might be property, which has been supplied by the defendant.  
In the latter case the law does not consider the damage as damage to property, which 
justifies an action in negligence but as an example of defective product that can be 
remedied by an action in contract.  
The above is an English law principle that was established by the House of Lords in 
the case of, Murphy v. Brentwood5.  
The principle laid down in the abovementioned case has become of paramount 
significance for construction law; for explaining dangerous defects and defects of 
quality; therefore, the following lengthy quotation from Lord Bridge is essential for 
explaining its rationale: 
"If a manufacturer, negligently, puts into circulation a chattel containing a latent 
defect, which renders it dangerous to persons or property, the manufacturer on the 
well-known principles established by the Donoghue v, Stevenson6, will be liable in 
tort for injury to persons or damage to property, which the chattel causes. But if a 
manufacturer produces and sells a chattel which is merely defective in quality, even to 
the extent that it is valueless for the purpose for which it is intended, the 
manufacturer’s liability at common law arises only under and by reference to the 
terms of any contract to which he is a party in relation to the chattel; the common law 
does not impose on him any liability in tort to persons to whom he owes no duty in 
contract but who having acquired the chattel suffer economic loss because the chattel 
is defective in quality. 
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If a dangerous defect in the chattel is discovered before it causes any personal injury 
or damage to property because the danger is now known and the chattel cannot be 
safely used unless the defect is repaired the defect merely becomes a defect in quality. 
The chattel is either capable of repair at economic cost or it is worthless and it must 
be scrapped. In either case the loss sustained by the owner or hirer of the chattel is 
purely economic. It is recoverable by any party who owes the loser a relevant 
contractual duty. But it is not recoverable in tort in the absence of a special 
relationship of proximity imposing on the tortfeasor a duty of care to safeguard the 
plaintiff from economic loss. There is no such special relationship between the 
manufacturer of a chattel and a remote owner or hirer.  
I believe these principles are equally applicable to buildings. If a builder erects a 
structure containing a latent defect, which renders it dangerous, he will be liable in 
tort for injury to persons or damage to property resulting from that dangerous defect. 
But if the defect becomes apparent before any injury or damage has been caused the 
loss sustained by the building owner is purely economic. 
If the defect can be repaired at economic cost that is the measure of the loss. If the 
building cannot be repaired, it may have to be abandoned as unfit for occupation and 
therefore valueless. These economic losses are recoverable if they flow from breach 
of a relevant contractual duty, but here again, in the absence of a special relationship 
of proximity they are not recoverable in tort. The only qualification I would make to 
this is that, if a building stands so close to the boundary of the building owner’s land 
that after discovery of the dangerous defect it remains a potential source of injury to 
persons or property on neighbouring land or on the highway, the building owner 
ought, in principle to be, entitled to recover in tort from the negligent builder the cost 
of obviating the danger, whether by repair or by demolition, so far as that cost is 
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necessarily incurred in order to protect himself from potential liability to third 
parties.”           
In the earlier case of D&F Estates v. Church Commissioners for England7, Lord 
Bridge explained the difference between property damage and pure economic loss by 
describing what was called the “Complex Structure Theory”. The mentioned theory 
deals with the situation where the structure comprises a number of distinct parts. It 
follows from such complex structure that defects in one part (like the foundation) 
might lead to damage to other parts (like a wall) supported by the foundation.  
According to the theory, in this case, the contractor who built the foundation is liable 
for economic loss that can, only, be recovered from him in contract. But, as far as 
damage to the wall is concerned, the plaintiff can, still, recover damages from the 
contractor in tort because the contractor’s negligence with regard to the foundation 
leads to damage of other property owned by the plaintiff." 
b) Failure of the architect to supervise:  
This issue was dealt with in two cases, namely, Clayton v. Woodman & Son Builders 
Ltd.8 and Clay v. J Crump & Son Ltd9. 
 In the former case, the plaintiff was a workman injured in the collapse of some 
masonry following the visit of the architect to the site. It was alleged that the collapse 
happened because of the architect’s failure to vary the work. It was held that the role 
of the architect was to advise the client and he was entitled to assume that the 
contractor would execute the work safely and that he owed no duty of care to the 
contractor or the workers on the site. However, the architect can be held liable in 
negligence if (in the words of Lord Justice Pearson): “there is some evidence that the 
architect directed the workman to do something dangerous- that is to say something 
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that the architect knew or ought to have known would be done in such a manner that 
would be dangerous- then it might well be that some duty would have been imposed 
on the architect.”  
Thus, it can be said that the architect’s liability could arise in case he gives advice as 
to the mode of undertaking the construction or if he directs that work which is 
inherently dangerous. 
In the case of Clay v. J Crump, the architect allowed a wall to be put into a dangerous 
condition. When the wall collapsed the architect was found jointly liable with the 
contractor, in negligence. 
In Demars v. Dufresne10 the Supreme Court of Canada held a consultant 
engineer 50 per cent liable to a contractor for failing to detect a glaring error in the 
latter’s compressed air calculations which had been submitted for approval, and which 
resulted in an explosion and economic loss to the contractor. Very shortly after, this 
case was purportedly followed in Manitoba in Trident Consuction v. Wardrop11 where 
Wilson J. held an engineer partly liable, together with specialist sub-contractors, to 
the main contractor for failure to warn the latter that his working platform might be 
too low and subject to flooding.   
It is submitted that these two Canadian cases are not of general authority, even in 
Canada and that in principle a professional owes no affirmative duty of care to a 
contractor to safeguard him form economic loss. Only a positive unqualified 
intervention or representation made or given in circumstances in which the 
professional could be said to accept responsibility for its efficacy or accuracy, would 
fall within the terms of the Hedley Byrne principle  
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Sudanese law distinguishes between liability for defects in design on the one hand and 
liability for supervision of the execution on the other. An engineer who designs the 
works is only liable for defects in the design; he would not incur extra liability except 
in case of his supervision of the execution of such works.  
Section 387 of the Civil Transaction Act 1984 reads as follows; 
"If the engineer’s work is confined to preparing the design only without the 
supervision of the execution of the works, he shall be liable only for the defect in the 
design. If the contractor carries out the works under the supervision of an engineer or 
the employer who acts as such, the contractor shall be liable only for improper 
execution but not for any defect arising form the design. 
(2) Any term exempting or limiting the liability of the contractor or the engineer for 
compensation shall be void." 
No authority on the application of this section has been found but it can be interpreted 
to provide for liability of the engineer in case of negligent supervision of the works. 
However, the need for more elaboration is great because the section in its present 
wording does not clearly cover all occasions of negligent supervision.  
It is, also, noteworthy that the section prohibits the parties from limiting or exempting 
themselves from liability for compensation. Such prohibition is against what is known 
as liability cap, which is a common preference nowadays in construction contracts as 
well as other contracts. 
The trend in the English and Canadian cases referred to above can be very useful if 
adopted to qualify the application of the section and any future reform.  
c) Liability related to design professional: 
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Liability of design professionals was discussed in Edgeworth Construction Ltd. V.F. 
Lea & Associates12 where a road works authority employed consulting engineers to 
design a length of highway and to prepare a full contract documentation, including 
specifications and construction drawings.  The successful tenderer after completing 
the project sued the engineers for economic loss said to be caused by negligence in 
design work including the preparation of plans and specifications and their 
incorporation into the tender documents, on which the contractors allegedly relied. On 
a preliminary objection by the engineers that as a matter of law they owed no duty to 
the contractors, held, by the British Columbia Court of appeal, following Pacific 
associates v. Baxter13 that the contractual relationship in a construction project were a 
crucial element in determining liability.  The whole question of errors in design or in 
plans and specifications was appropriate subject- matter for the contract between the 
contractors and the Ministry. By contrast the engineers had no opportunity to define 
with the contractors the risks they were prepared to assume. Not being in contractual 
relations. Nor could they control the contents of the contract between the Ministry and 
the contractors. The contractors had an opportunity to protect themselves in their 
contract with the Ministry in relation to risks they were prepared to bear. On the facts 
there was no sufficient proximity between the engineers and contractors to support a 
duty of care to avoid economic loss by successful tenderers, Held by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, reversing the court of Appeal, that the engineers had knowingly 
undertaken to provide information (the tender package) for use by a defined class 
(tenderers) for the purpose of preparing their prices and the plaintiffs as tenderes had 
reasonably relied on the information so that, prima facie, there was a cause of action 
unless their construction contract with the owners negated that duty.  
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Clause 42 of that contract stated that any representations in the tender documents 
were furnished merely for the general information of bidders and were not in anyway 
warranted or guaranteed on behalf of the Minister.  This arguably absolved the 
Authority from any liability for the plans, but on its express words did not purport to 
protect the engineers against liability for their representation. Clause 42 was 
consistent with the conclusion that the protection was intended for the benefit of the 
province alone. The engineers could have taken measures to protect themselves by 
placing a disclaimer of responsibility on the design documents, alternatively they 
could have refused to provide design without ongoing supervision duties which would 
permit later alternations to the design or they could have insured against their liability, 
these circumstances negated any inference that the contractors had contractually 
excluded their right to sue for the design deficiencies. No policy reasons existed for 
denying the duty. The additional risks would be reflected in the price of the engineers 
contract.  If the contractor was limited to his rights against the construction owner he 
would have no rights in respect of defective plans at all. An important consideration 
against the engineers would be that the tendering contractors would be obliged to do 
their own engineering and review the accuracy of the engineering design and 
information. Repeating the process already undertaken by the owner.  This would 
have to be done in the short time available of two weeks. It would be more sensible 
for one firm to be responsible for the adequacy of the design, barring contractual 
disclaimers, it would be better for owners to pay more for engineering services than 
the indirect cost of additional engineers engaged by all tendering parties. Held also 
that the duty was owned only by the engineering firm and not by its individual 
engineers who had.14 
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d) Negligent statements: 
Decided English and American cases show the various situations whereby negligent 
statements can affect the liability of the maker. The following can be referred to: 
? Responsibility to obtain by-law approvals: 
In Townsend v. Cinema News15, an architect told a builder he would be 
responsible for issuing the necessary notices for by-law approval. Work was done 
which, without approval would be in breach of the by - laws and the builder 
became liable to the owner for the cost of work to obtain by-law compliance. 
Held, by the Court of Appeal, that the architect as a professional man had acted 
gratuitously in offering his services and accordingly owned a duty to the builder to 
do so to the best of his skill notwithstanding the absence of consideration. 
? Misleading Soil Specialist Report: 
In Miller v. Dames and Moore16 soil specialists, employed by consulting 
engineers to a local authority, provided a report prior to tenders being invited. 
There were express exclusions of liability in the contract documents protecting the 
authority and their consultant but not the soils engineers. The specialists report 
misled the contractor causing him economic loss. For which he sued the 
specialists in tort.  Held by a Californian Court of Appeal that in the absence of 
evidence that the defendants did not know their report was intended to provide 
information to tenders, they were liable in tort to the contractors. 
? Inaccurate survey plat: 
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In Rozny v. Manual17 a surveyor prepared "plats" or setting out surveys of building 
plots, each containing a certificate of accuracy, for a developer, who sold on a plot to 
a home owner together with the survey. The house and garage that were built, then, 
encroached on neighbour's pot,  
Held by the Supreme Court of Illinois, the surveyor was liable to the homeowner in 
tort. 
 
? Clear certificate causing financial loss: 
In the Minister of Housing v. Sharp18 the official in charge of the local Land Charges 
Register negligently issued a clear certificate to a prospective purchaser of land. This 
positively benefited the representee / purchaser, since it rendered unenforceable an 
earlier planning charge in favour of the government, held, the local authority was 
liable to the relevant government department for the financial loss.  
? Non-disclosure of facts during negotiations: 
In Dillingham Construction v. Downs19 a local authority, during negotiations for a 
dredging contact, did not disclose, in response to a general inquiry the existence of 
underground mine working beneath the sea bed of which records existed in its 
archives but which were unknown to the negotiating officers themselves, held by 
Hardie J., while the Hedley Byrne principle could exist between contracting parties, it 
should be applied with caution in the context of commercial negotiations leading up 
to a contract and in the absence of  any clear misrepresentation the authority was not 
liable.  
? Reassurance to sub-contractor of payment: 
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In Day v. Ost20 a sub-contractor, who discontinued working because he had not been 
paid was reassured by the architect that there were considerable sums owing to the 
main contractor sufficient to meet his account, and resumed working. The architect's 
statement was negligent, and the contractor had received nearly all the contract sum 
due to him. The sub-contractor sued the architect in tort for his loss when contractor 
became insolvent.  Held by Cooke J. there was a sufficient special relationship to 
render the architect liable for the sub-contractor's loss.  
 
? Negligent Issuance of Certificate of Conformity: 
In District of survey v church21 a consulting engineer, who was not a soils 
specialist, was employed by an architect to inspect trial pits and twice-
recommended deeper investigations, having seen silty clay in the pits but was told 
the owner would not agree. Later under strong pressure from the architect when 
building inspector queried the consultant's design he wrote a letter to the inspector 
stating that the material in the trial pits had a substantial bearing capacity. Later 
still he issued a certificate that the design conformed to the National Building 
Code.  
Held, by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, that the engineer was liable in tort 
to the owner, whom he knew was relying on him, for not warning him at the time 
he wrote to the inspector and also under the Hedley Byrne principle in regard to 
the certificate he had issued. 
? Damage by Digger Operator to Underground Cables: 
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In Clark Contractors Ltd v. Drewett22 a digger operator was sent by his employers 
to a site with his machine and was negligently misinformed by the contractor's 
foreman when he asked if there were any cables in a road, which his line of work 
was required to cross. He damaged post Office cables and was forced to pay a 
fine.  Held by Richarson J. applying Hedley Byrne case, that defendants by their 
foreman had assumed responsibility for giving accurate information, and were 
liable to reimburse the operator.  
 
 
? Wrong Estimation of Building Cost: 
In Abrams Ltd v. Ancliffe23 a builder after being shown preliminary floor plans 
and elevation confirmed an earlier estimate to a developer that the cost of two 
proposed residential units would be $30,500 and the developer made appropriate 
financing arrangements. Later the builder received detailed specifications from the 
architects, which he realised would be more expensive, but in spite of many 
inquiries as to final cost he gave no indication of an altered estimate until over 
$8,000 of work had been done, when he said the final price would be $57,000.  
The developer would have continued at a highest price of $ 40,000 and ultimately 
finished by another builder, but was unable to sell the houses profitably at the time 
of trial was letting them Held by Casey J., although the original estimate was not 
negligent, there was here a special and continuing relationship of trust and 
confidence in the builder by the developer who relying on the original estimate, 
drifted into an irreversible commitment to build at an uneconomic figure. The 
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builder should have told him of his doubts by the time work was due to start, and 
was liable in damages.  
? Negligent Statement regarding design of Television Mast 
In IBA v. EMI24 design and erection sub-contractors for a television mast started 
work, and later received an inquiry from the owners about its design, as a result of 
vibration and oscillation difficulties experienced by the owners with other masts 
elsewhere they replied we are satisfied these structures will not oscillate 
dangerously. As a result work continued without modification and the mast was 
completed, but subsequently failed.  
Held by the House of Lords, that the statement had been negligent, and the sub 
contractors were liable to the owners under the Hedley Byrne principle.  
? Liability to Valuation report 
In Yianni v. Edwin Evans25 a building society made a maximum loan of £12,000 to 
house buyers on the basis of a valuation report of their own surveyors, for which the 
buyers had to pay. The buyers were advised to obtain an independent survey, and also 
received statutory notification that the loan did not imply that the price was 
reasonable. Shortly after, subsidence occurred costing £ 18,000 to repair, and the 
buyers sued the surveyors in tort. They admitted negligence, but denied that they 
owed any duty to the buyers.  
Held by Park J., that the surveyors know the valuation would be passed on to the 
plaintiffs, who could be expected to rely upon its correctness in deciding to buy, 
notwithstanding the disclaimer as to the reasonability of the price. Accordingly there 
was a sufficient relationship of proximately in accordance with Hedley Byrne to 
render the surveyor liable to the buyers.  
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? Certification 
Certificates in construction are statements of opinion of the architect. These 
certificates are of great importance because financial consequences will frequently 
follow upon reliance on them.  
In Pacific Associates Ltd. V.Baxter26 dredging contractors operating under a 
FIDIC style contract with an ICC arbitration clause made a "Clause 12" 
unfavourable conditions claim for hard materials. The engineer rejected this 
on the grounds that the conditions were foreseeable. Subsequently the 
contractors asked for a decision of the engineer under clause 67 of the 
conditions, and then took a claim for £ 10 million. They, then, brought an 
action in tort against the engineer for their full loss, giving credit for sum 
received, alleging negligence and breach of a duty of care by the engineer 
when reconsidering and deciding their claim as required by clause 67 of the 
contract.  Details of the engineer’s contract with the owner were not known, 
but by clause 85 he was not to be an arbitrator when deciding or certifying, but 
to use his professional skill and knowledge of the works, and was not bound to 
give reasons: by clause 86 neither the engineer nor his staff were to be 
personally liable for the acts or obligations under the contract, or answerable 
for omission on the part of the employer in the observance or performance of 
any of the acts, matters or things which are herein contained, clause 67 was in 
the FIDIC third edition form permitting immediate arbitration of a disputed 
engineer’s decision. Held by the court of Appeal, that the claim should be 
struck out as disclosing no cause of action:   
? Opinion as to aircraft noise effects on property  
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Recently, the House of Lords dealt with the issue of consultant’s negligence in Farley 
v Skinner27. The facts of the case can be summed up as follows:  
Mr Farley, who was a businessman, who wanted to retire to the country and chose to 
buy a house in Sussex, some 15 miles from Gatwick Airport.  
He engaged Mr. Skinner to survey the property. As well as having to investigate the 
usual matters expected of a surveyor, Mr. Skinner was specifically asked by Mr. 
Farley to investigate whether the property would be affected by aircraft noise. Mr. 
Farley told Mr. Skinner he did not want a property on a flight path. Mr. Skinner 
provided a satisfactory report on the property. On the subject of aircraft noise, he 
reported that he was not conscious of this during the time of his inspection, and 
thought it unlikely that the property would suffer greatly from such noise, although 
some planes would inevitably cross the area, depending on the direction of the wind 
and the positioning of the flight path.  
In fact, the house was not far from a navigation beacon, the Mayfield Stack, and at 
certain busy times, especially in the morning, the early evening, and weekends, 
aircraft waiting to land at Gatwick Airport would be stacked up maintaining a spiral 
course around the beacon until there was a landing slot at the airport. Aircraft 
frequently passed directly over or nearly over the house.  
The impact of aircraft noise on the property was marked, as Mr. Skinner could have 
readily discovered if he had checked with Gatwick. Ignorant of the aircraft noise 
problem, Mr. Farley proceeded to purchase the house and spent £125,000 refurbishing 
it. When he moved in, he promptly discovered the noise problem, but decided not to 
sell. Mr. Farley duly sued Mr. Skinner for damages for a diminution in the value of 
the property caused by the aircraft noise. The trial judge found that Mr. Skinner had 
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been negligent and that if he had carried out his instructions properly, Mr. Farley 
would not have bought the property. The House of Lords unanimously allowed the 
appeal.  
Lord Scott of Foscote thought the case could be decided by the principles stated in 
1854 in Hadley v Baxendale to the effect that, if Mr. Skinner had done his job 
properly Mr. Farley would have obtained the correct information about aircraft noise 
(i.e. the benefit of his bargain with Mr. Skinner) and would not have bought the 
house. 
In general, the position of Sudanese law is similar to that of English Law regarding 
the existence of a special duty between the plaintiff and the maker of the statement. In 
the case of Nile Import and Export Company Ltd. vs. Mohammed Nuri Osman28 
stress has been laid on the necessity of the existence of special duty between the 
plaintiff and the maker of the statement. It was held in that case:  
“A plaintiff cannot recover damages in an action for negligence for loss caused to him 
by a negligent statement unless he can prove that the maker of the statement was 
under special duty to him to be careful and the maker has failed to exercise such 
duty.” 
ii) Nuisance: 
Nuisance as a tort arises when the defendant interferes with the plaintiff’s land. 
Interference could be classified into physical injury to the land and interference with 
the enjoyment of the land. 
Lord Westbury drew the distinction between the two categories of nuisance in the 
case of St. Helen’s Smelting Company v. Tipping29 in the following quotation: 
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“It appears to me that it is a very desirable thing to mark the difference between an 
action brought for nuisance upon the ground that the alleged nuisance produces 
material injury to the property and an action brought on the ground that the thing 
alleged to be a nuisance is productive of sensible personal discomfort. With regard to 
the latter, namely, the personal inconvenience and interference with one’s enjoyment, 
one’s quiet, one’s personal freedom, any thing that decomposes or injuriously affects 
the senses of the nerves, whether that may or may not be denominated a nuisance, 
must undoubtedly depend greatly on the circumstances of the place where the thing 
complained of actually occurs. If a man lives in a town it is necessary that he should 
subject himself to the consequences of those operations of town, it is necessary that he 
should subject himself to the consequences of those operations of trade, which may be 
carried on in his immediate locality, which are actually necessary for trade and 
commerce, and also for the enjoyment of property, and for the benefit of the 
inhabitants of the town and the public at large…I think, my Lords, that in case of that 
description the submission required from persons living in society to that amount of 
discomfort which may be necessary for the legitimate and free exercise of the trade of 
their neighbours would not apply to circumstances the immediate result of which is 
sensible injury to the value of the property".    
According to the abovementioned precedent a defendant to an 
action in nuisance would normally raise the defense of 
“reasonable use of the land”, but many factors have to be 
considered in order to decide on such a defense. Typical 
relevant matters are: 
? The seriousness of the interference. 
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? The duration of the interference. 
? The locality. 
? The motivation of the defendant. 
? Whether the defendant’s use of his land is or is not ordinary. 
? The impracticability of avoiding the interference. 
The above factors are relevant to construction work because although nuisance often 
causes substantial inconvenience to the neighbours but the above factors have to be 
proven in order to decide whether or not such nuisance is actionable. 
The case of Andreae v. Selfridge & Co.30, the defendants undertook very large 
construction activities in Oxford Street in London in the 1930s. The plaintiff who was 
in business as an hotelier in the neighbourhood, complained that the construction was 
causing a nuisance. The argument by the plaintiff was dismissed on the grounds that 
the activities were normal and that it was reasonable in view of the developments of 
the day.   
But, Sir Wilfrede Green MR, nevertheless, found that there was an actionable 
nuisance on the grounds that the amount of the dust, which emanated from the site, 
was excessive. He went on to make general observations as follows: 
? Interference with the comfort of neighbors can only 
be justified as normal and usual if conducted under 
proper care and skill. 
? Proper precautions should be taken and the nuisance should be 
reduced to the minimum.” 
a) Distinction between nuisance and trespass: 
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Wallace elaborated on the distinction between nuisance and trespass31. In his opinion 
nuisance is to be distinguished from trespass with which it, in some cases, overlaps in 
that it usually arises from an unreasonable state of affairs on the occupier’s land as a 
result of which the use or the enjoyment of the plaintiff land is impaired or in some 
cases physical damage is done to property or person, for example by flood resulting 
from blocked drains on the defendant’s land or by cricket balls from a ground which 
is too small.  
Thus unguarded scaffolding from which objects fall onto adjoining land might well 
qualify. The fact that such a nuisance is created by an occupier or by persons on the 
land of another as, for example, by contractor’s negligence, will be irrelevant. 
Moreover even if the defendant does not himself create the nuisance he will be liable 
if he knows or ought to know of it and has allowed it to continue. Similarly if the 
nuisance is due to a latent defect where the occupier could, with reasonable care, have 
known of it. Thus there is very little scope for the defense of no negligence. In 
practice the burden of proof of showing inevitable accident or absence of fault will 
shift to the defendant unlike other cases of negligence.  
However, unlike trespass a nuisance is not actionable without proof of damage 
whether in form of physical damage or interference with enjoyment or use of 
plaintiff’s land. The question of nuisance or no nuisance will often be a relative one 
involving concepts of reasonableness and differing with the locality and types of 
premises. 
Thus in the case of noise a common accompaniment of building or demolition the 
question will be what is an unreasonable level of noise after taking account of 
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reasonable restrictions on hours of working and of what is reasonable in a business 
district for example. 
The duty in nuisance, also, appears to be non-delegable, so that an owner will be 
liable for a private nuisance caused by his independent contractors.  
Acts, which may amount to nuisance, can never be confined to any limited variety of 
examples. The following cases illustrate a few examples: 
? Nuisance caused by blocking a “khor” 
In Town Council of Omdurman v. El Nur Ibrahim32 the defendant Council 
constructed a culvert in the passage of a Khor adjoining the plaintiff’s house; the 
culvert was too narrow with the result that the Khor was obstructed and rainwater 
overflowed into the plaintiff’s premises. The defendant Council also established a 
market near plaintiff’s house and failed to provide latrines, with the result that people 
from the market used the Khor instead. In an action on these facts, Held: (i) the 
defendant was liable in nuisance and negligence for causing the overflow of water (ii) 
That since the nuisance arising from the use of the Khor as a latrine was neither 
created nor authorized by the defendant Council and occurred without their 
knowledge no action lay. The proper remedy was criminal proceedings against 
individual members of the public creating the nuisance.  
? Nuisance caused by droppings of pigeons: 
In Wandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc33, pigeons’ droppings 
fouling pavement below bridge was held to be causing inconvenience, danger and 
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health hazard to pedestrians and the Highway authority was allowed to pursue claim 
in public nuisance. 
The facts were that feral pigeons roosting under a bridge fouled the pavement beneath 
and caused inconvenience to passing pedestrians with their droppings, thereby 
interfering with the right of the public to use and enjoy the public highway. The 
owners of the bridge were held liable to the highway authority in public nuisance 
because they knew of the nuisance and had the opportunity and means to abate it but 
had failed to do so.  
The Court of Appeal so held in dismissing an appeal by the defendant and held that 
the defendant was liable in public nuisance for the fouling of the public highway 
caused by pigeons roosting under the defendant's railway bridge in Balham High 
Street. 
Kennedy LJ stated that it had been clear that where there was a public nuisance on the 
defendant's land it did not matter whether it had been created by the defendant or 
some third party, or by natural causes. If the defendant was aware of the nuisance, had 
had a reasonable opportunity to abate, had the means to abate it, and had chosen not to 
do so, then he was liable. See also, Slater v Worthington's Cash Stores34. 
It was clear beyond argument that interference with the right of the public to enjoy the 
highway in a reasonable comfort and convenience could amount to a public nuisance. 
So the judge had been entitled to find as a fact, as he had, that in this case there was a 
public nuisance. The defendant had submitted that pigeons proliferated because the 
community provided food, and so the local authority, representing the community, 
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should solve the problems by the exercise of statutory powers given to it in section 74 
of the Public Health Act 1961 to abate any nuisance, annoyance or danger caused by 
the congregation of pigeons in any built-up area, and by the exercise of its contractual 
and statutory street cleaning obligations.  
But that argument was rejected on the ground that the claim was not concerned with 
the problem of pigeons in general. It was concerned with the nuisance caused by the 
pigeons, which roosted under the railway bridge, and that was a nuisance, which the 
defendant had a clear legal duty to address.  
It is noteworthy that the decision in this case is different from the decision in the 
Sudanese precedent of Town Council of Omdurman, referred to in the above bullet. 
Comparison might not disclose too much dissimilarity between the two cases if we 
accept the fact that in both cases the owners created structures, which were likely, in 
the circumstances, to attract the causes of the nuisance in question.  
 
iii) Trespass to land: 
Trespass to land is the unjustifiable interference with the possession of land. 
Possession might be of two types; possession in fact and possession in law.  
Trespass was defined by Sudanese law in the 
Sudanese precedent Naima Hassan and Another vs. 
Mursi Hassan35 where it was held that: 
“A person who has lawfully entered on land belonging to another remains on the land 
after his right of entry has ceased commits a trespass.” 
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Possession in fact is also referred to as custody, detention or de facto possession. This 
type of possession is defined as power to use the land and exclude others from using it 
provided that no one else has equal or greater power. 
Possession in law normally exists in conjunction with possession in fact but its 
practical significance is that in some cases a person may part with possession in fact 
but still retains possession in law and can sue for trespass. 
Construction activities can result in some kind or another of trespass to land. Three 
common examples may be mentioned in this context. 
? Interference: 
Interference with the possession of land may occur in many ways, for example the 
unauthorized walking into the land by the contractor’s workers on or going into 
the buildings upon it, but it is equally trespass if building materials are allowed to 
fall into the land or even a ladder is placed by a worker on the wall of the 
neighboring land.  
Doing the same in excess of a permission to enter the neighboring land or after 
such permission expires is also trespass. The difference between trespass and 
nuisance is sometimes elusive, the rule is that for trespass the injury must be direct 
and immediate but if it is indirect and consequential there may be a remedy for 
nuisance36.  
? Trespass to subsoil: 
An intrusion into the subsoil is trespass against the person in possession of the 
subsoil, an example of this can the construction of a tunnel37.  
? Trespass to the airspace: 
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It was held in the case of Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Co38, also referred to in the 
examples below, that an advertising sign erected by the defendants on their own 
property which projected into the airspace above the plaintiff’s shop, created a 
trespass. But it was stated that the building’s owner’s rights in airspace extends, only, 
to the height which is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land and 
structures on it, so the flight of an aircraft several hundred feet above a house is not a 
trespass. 
The difference between trespass and nuisance was further highlighted. It was stated 
that trespass differs from nuisance in its involvement of a positive act of interference 
or entry however slight into the property of the plaintiff. It is actionable, unlike 
nuisance, without proof of damage. It, also, involves a degree of deliberation thus 
scaffolding from which objects are likely to drop onto property is a nuisance but 
objects thrown down onto adjoining land is a trespass. Ignorance of the boundaries 
will be no excuse. The slightest violation of a boundary will be a trespass such as 
placing objects on the plaintiff’s land, driving nails into his wall, using it to support 
scaffolding or leaving a ladder planks or a shed or piling rubbish against it. It is also a 
trespass to make excessive use of a private right of way. 
Trespass equally includes a violation of the airspace above the plaintiff’s land at any 
rate at a height, which would interfere with any possible use of his land. 
Moreover an injunction is obtainable as of right and as a mater of course in the case of 
continuing trespasses and there is no question of balancing the plaintiff’s interest 
against that of the defendant or of the public and it will be irrelevant that the plaintiff 
has in fact suffered no damage.  
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The following examples can help to illustrate a few examples of trespass in English 
law: 
? Projecting Advertising sign: 
In Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Co 39 an advertising sign was erected projecting 
into airspace above the plaintiff’s property. He claimed a mandatory injunction 
for its removal. The defendant argued that, at best, the sign constituted a 
nuisance, and that there was no inconvenience for the plaintiff. Held, by 
MacNair J. that the sign was a trespass and even if there was no inconvenience 
the plaintiff was entitled to his injunction:  
? Scaffolding partly over neighboring land: 
In John Trendbest Ltd v. National Westminster Bank40 an adjoining owners building 
was dangerous and needed repair. His neighbor refused a request for a license to put 
scaffolding partly over and partly onto his property. The defendant nevertheless 
proceeded to erect the scaffolding. The plaintiff sought an injunction. The defendant 
asked for a suspension of the injunction while the repairs were carried out. Held by 
Walton J not following Stamp J. who had granted but suspended an injunction where 
a tower crane had over sailed adjoining property (Wollerton & Wilson Ltd. V. Costain 
Ltd.41 an injunction must issue as a matter of course and no suspension could be 
granted notwithstanding that the damage suffered would be so slight as to be trivial.  
? Tower Crane swinging over neighboring land 
Occupiers of three properties sought an injunction against the use by a developer 
of two tower cranes whose booms whether free, swinging or in use would over 
sail their properties. In only one case was there any possibility of interference 
with the use of that plaintiff’s property, and that in the future when the owner 
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might himself wish to develop using a tower crane. The cranes were too high to 
interfere with the normal use of any of the properties so that no damage at all 
would be suffered. The development was of a nature where it would be 
reasonable and economic to use tower cranes  
It was contended that the cranes were, at most, a nuisance and that in the 
absence of proof of damage the action must fail; Held, by Scott J following the 
Kelsen and Woolerton cases the invasion of a neighbor’s airspace was trespass 
and proof of damage was not required.  
Trespass following Trendbest and not following Woolerton did not depend upon 
any balancing of rights nor was the balance of convenience at the interlocutory 
stage of any relevance and the injunction must issue forthwith (Anchor 
Brewhouse v. Berky House)42  
It should perhaps be noted that in trespass cases such as the above it has been held 
that damages can be recovered on the basis of a reasonable payment or remuneration 
for licensing the trespass. 
In Sudanese law we can see further specific issues related to trespass in section 608 of 
the Civil Transactions Act 1984 
The section reads as follows: 
“Where a person, out of materials belonging to him, constructs buildings or other 
structure or grew plants on land which he knows it does not belong to him and he has 
no right to carry out such structure thereupon, or where his lack of knowledge is 
attributable to a grave mistake on his part, the owner of such land may, within one 
year of the date of such construction, claim the removal of such structures in addition 
to compensation for damage, if any.  
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If he did not claim removal or elected to retain such structures, he shall be liable to 
indemnify the owner of the materials to the extent of its value when served, or to pay 
a sum equivalent to the enhancement in the value of the land. 
(2) Where the person who constructed the building or structures or grew the plants, 
referred to in the above sub-section obtained a license from the land owner, or he 
honestly believed that he has a right to perform such acts, the land owner shall not be 
entitled to claim removal thereof, but he shall have the option either to pay the value 
of such materials and the costs of labor or to pay a sum equivalent to the enhancement 
in the value of the land brought about by such improvements; that is in the case where 
the owner of the materials did not demand severance and such severance will not 
seriously prejudice the land.  
However, if those improvements were of such a magnitude that it will be financially 
burdensome for the land owner to pay for them, he may apply for the transfer of the 
ownership of the land to the owner of the materials on payment of just 
compensation.” 
(3) The court may, on the application of the party liable to pay compensation 
according to sub-sections “1” and “2” to decide what it deems suitable to execute its 
judgment, and it may especially decide that execution shall be in periodical 
installments on condition of sufficient securities."         
Section 609 empowers Sudanese courts to adjust the situation of a trespasser who 
commits a negligible trespass on land in good faith as follows: 
"Where a land owner, while constructing buildings encroaches, in good faith, over a 
trifle portion of the adjoining land, the court may order the transfer to him of the 
ownership of the occupied portion on payment of a just consideration." 
iv) The tort of interference: 
  li
Winfield defines the tort of interference as follows: A commits a tort if without lawful 
justification he intentionally interferes with the contract between B and C (a) by 
persuading B to break his contract with C or (b) by some other act perhaps only if 
tortious in itself which prevents B from performing his contract.  
Winfield has explained the essentials of the tort of interference as follows43: 
? It has to be established that A has brought a 
breach of contract between B and C. The causal 
connection between A conduct and the breach 
requiring strict proof. It is therefore not tortious 
to persuade a person lawfully to terminate a 
contract and there is no tort if the contract 
allegedly broken proves to be void. 
? The plaintiff must prove that he has suffered 
damage as a result of the breach of the contract. 
? It is often stated that A must have acted with 
knowledge of the existence of the contractual 
relations between B and C. 
 
v) Breach of Statutory Duty: 
The ingredients are as follows: 
a) The statutory duty must be owed to the 
plaintiff: The defendant in question must 
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owe a duty to the plaintiff according to the 
statute as some statute are so express as to 
limit the classes of persons who benefit from 
them. In Hartley v. Mayoh & Co.44 a fireman 
was electrocuted while fighting a fire at the 
defendant’s factory. His widow relied inter 
alia upon the breach by the defendants of 
their obligations under certain statutory 
obligations but these existed only for the 
protections of persons employed and 
firemen did not come within this description. 
The claim for breach of statutory duty thus 
failed. 
b) The injury must be of a kind which the statute intends to prevent. 
c) The defendant must be guilty of breach of his statutory obligation. 
d) The breach of duty must have caused the damage. 
The duties laid down by the Civil Transactions Act 
1984 regarding “Personal, Occupational and 
Professional Harm” provide examples for statutory 
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duties the breach of which constitutes a breach of 
tortious liability. 
Section 160 provides that any person who is employed by another or is engaged in 
work for another and thereby causes harm to that other person or anyone else through 
the abuse of his position, disregard of his duties or unjustified negligence in its 
performance shall be personally liable to pay compensation for the harm caused to 
others. According to the section the term “others” include juristic as well as natural 
persons. It can therefore be taken as a tortuous duty imposed by statute. 
The Act gives examples of personal, occupational and pprofessional harm in section 
162.  
The section does not refer to particular cases, which can be taken as construction 
examples but sub-sections (i) and (j) can be applicable to construction as well as other 
cases. The two sub-sections read as follows: 
"Giving misleading professional advice with the intention of causing harm to 
another or in reckless disregard of the rights of the person seeking advice and 
without regard to the requirements of normal effort expected of an advisor. 
If the other party is state, it may constitute personal occupational and professional 
liability to exercise unlawful partiality in any public business or business of a 
public nature, the abuse of occupational position to conclude losing or illusionary 
transaction or cause personal gain or conduct negotiations which are harmful to 
the state whether that was due to negligence or recklessness or in order to cause 
wrongful gain to himself or another, as well as preparing false or misleading 
reports in any business of a public nature or in relation to a public servant , 
whether to cause benefit or harm ." 
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According to the section, personal occupational or professional liability is presumed 
wherever the harm is too serious to occur without gross negligence or bad faith. 
Any Sudanese citizen is entitled to ask the Attorney General to sue for personal 
occupational or professional liability whenever the party suffering harm is the State or 
one of its public utilities. 
In the case of Osman Mohammed Ahmed Al Ga’ali v. Mahmood Irahim Hilmi45 the 
issue in question was the causing of damage while negligently doing an act authorized 
by the legislator. It was held by the Court of Appeal that a person who is authorized to 
do an act by a legislator is liable for negligence because he must use reasonable 
diligence in doing such act. 
Daffalla Al Radi J stated the following:  
“ It is true that applicant pulled down the buildings while so authorized by the 
municipality, we are not questioning his authority. Applicant ought to have used 
diligence and steps to avoid as much and as practically as possible the causing of 
damage to respondent.  
He failed to do so on his own peril. It has been said in David Geddis v. Proprietors of 
the Bann Reservoir46: - 
“ For I take it without citing cases that it is now thoroughly well established that no 
action will lie for that which the legislator has authorized if it be done without 
negligence although it does occasion damage to any one; but an action does lie for 
doing that which the legislator has authorized if it be negligently done.” 
Applicant, it is clear from the record, ransacked the place and hence, at least acted 
negligently if not maliciously.” 
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We have repeatedly expressed our reluctance to disturb findings of fact in absence of 
flagrant violation of the rules of evidence and reasons. The learned District Judge 
made it clear in discussing applicant’s testimony that he could not believe applicant’s 
witnesses. He is the best judge on the facts no doubt.” 
The above decision is in line with the earlier precedent 
of Hamad Al Noor vs. Modern Aluminium Works47 
where there was a breach of statutory duty under The 
Workshops and Factories Regulations ss. 33(1) 37,44. 
The same issue arose, too, in the case of Khartoum 
Municipal Council v. Michele Cotran48 where the 
exercise of powers granted under the local 
government Ordinance 1951 was in question. 
In that case the defendant had dug a drain between 4.5 and 5 meters from the side of 
an unlit road in a residential area in Khartoum. The drain was uncovered, unlit and 
unguarded but in the night in question there was dim light shed on it from nearby. The 
plaintiff, a district judge and his companion arrived in the road by car to attend a party 
at the Iraqi Embassy and were obliged to leave the car about 150 yards from their 
destination. The plaintiff left the road in order to avoid a traffic jam and in attempting 
to take a short cut fell into the drain. As a result he suffered injuries to his left foot 
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involving a surgical operation (arthrodesis) and considerable pain and suffering. The 
final outcome was a stiff painless useful foot amounting to a 70% disability. 
The judge of the High Court Khartoum found out that the defendant was guilty of 
negligence and awarded 7.332.850 Sudanese Pounds as damages; 2.332.850 as special 
damages and 5.000.000 as general damages as general damage. 
Held: 
1. The author of danger immediately adjoining a public highway owes a 
duty of care to lawful users of the highway whether or not the danger 
is in law part of the highway.  
2. The immunities attaching to a private owner who dedicates a highway 
to the public do not extend to public authorities acting in pursuance of 
statutory powers or duties. 
3. An unlit, uncovered and unguarded drain 2.5 meters wide and 2 
meters deep immediately adjoining a highway does not constitute an 
insignificant danger to which the defense de minimis non curat lex 
can apply. 
The power given to the council was permissive and discretionary but there was 
nothing in the Ordinance to override the common law presumption that the power 
when exercised should be exercised with due care. The appellant owed a duty to users 
of the highway and having failed to exercise reasonable care was liable in negligence. 
In the Heirs Of Rahamtalla Ahmed El Medina V. Sudan Light And Power Co49 The 
deceased, an employee of defendants, walked over the checker plates covering the 
sump of a boiler in a yard on defendants’ premises. Owing to defendants’ negligence 
the sump was not guarded and the checker plates were not properly secured, with the 
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result that, when the deceased stepped on the plates, they moved, and he fell through 
the opening into the hot water in the sump and was killed. Plaintiff, the widow, 
children and parents of the deceased, sued as heirs and dependants of the deceased for 
damages for the deceased’s death. Defendants admitted their own negligence, but 
claimed that the deceased was contributorily negligent in walking over the sump, 
which he knew to be dangerous, and could have avoided. Defendants also disputed 
plaintiffs’ assessment of damages. Held.: Defendants were liable for breach of 
statutory duty, i.e., for breach of Workshops and Factories Regulations 1952, r. 9. 
 
 
vi) Liability For Dangerous Structures And Occupier's Liability: 
By this title concern is laid on the duties of the occupier of dangerous structures 
to persons who enter therein. Winfield says50 that liability for dangerous 
structures forms a special sub-head of the general doctrine of negligence. The 
duties are owed to four kinds of persons in the following descending scale:  
a) The highest degree of care is owed by the occupier to one who enters 
in pursuance of a contract with him. 
b) A less degree is due to an invitee who without any contract enters on 
business of interest both to himself and the occupier. 
c) Still less is due to the invitee who comes on the occupier’s permission 
on business of interest to himself but of none to the occupier. 
d) Scarcely any, at all, to a trespasser. The only duty of the occupier to a 
trespasser is not to injure him deliberately or recklessly.  
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? Liability towards a trespasser who dived into a dangerous 
lake in Public Park 
In the case of Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council and another51 Ward, Sedley 
and Longmore LJJ: discussed the issue of occupier's liability to a trespasser who 
swam in a dangerous lake situated in public park. The claimant got injured when he 
dived in the lake despite warning notices prohibiting swimming. It was found by the 
court that by virtue of s 1 of the Occupiers Liability Act 1984 a local authority which 
was well aware that its "no swimming" policy was habitually being flouted by persons 
who went into a lake in a public park owed a duty of care to provide effective 
protection against the grave risk of injury to such persons. The authority's placing of 
warning notices and use of park rangers did not establish that it had taken reasonable 
care to prevent injury.  
The Court of Appeal (Longmore LJ dissenting) allowed an appeal by the claimant, 
John Peter Tomlinson, from the dismissal by Jack J, sitting in Manchester in March 
2001, of his claim for damages for severe injuries against Congleton Borough Council 
and Cheshire County Council. An assessment by the judge of two-thirds contributory 
negligence by the claimant made on the basis that liability was established was upheld 
by the court and an order made remitting the case for damages to be assessed. The 
facts of the case were as follows: 
On a hot day in May 1995 the claimant, aged 18, went with friends to Brereton Heath 
Park in which a disused quarry had for many years formed a lake. Ignoring warning 
signs, he went into the lake and was seriously injured as a result of making a shallow 
dive. The council that owned and occupied the park was aware that in hot weather the 
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lake was a magnet to the public, its sandy beaches inviting swimming. It knew of the 
dangers to swimmers and the disregard of warnings. It planned to landscape and plant 
the beach areas as a deterrent. That work was not completed at the time of the 
claimant's accident. 
Ward LJ said that the claimant accepted that by going into the water he ceased to be a 
visitor and became a trespasser. S 1 of the 1984 Act defined when an occupier owed a 
duty to persons other than visitors and, if so, what the standard of care was. It was 
essential that those provisions acted as a template in every case. The council's 
warnings over many years were known to be ineffective to prevent swimming and the 
grave risk of injury to those entering the water. The circumstances were such as to 
impose a duty on the council to carry out the planned landscaping as an effective 
deterrent to swimmers. It followed that the council was in breach of the duty it owed 
to the claimant to take reasonable care to see that he did not suffer injury at the park 
by reason of the dangers awaiting those who entered the water to swim. 
Sedley LJ gave a concurring judgment. 
Longmore LJ, dissenting, said that there were obvious dangers in swimming in any 
stretch of water other than a swimming pool. That the council promoted the site for 
leisure activities did not require it to prevent swimming unless it knew of a particular 
hazard. Even then to give a warning of such hazard should probably suffice. 
This English common law approach was dealt with by The Occupier’s Liability Act 
1957 where liability of the occupier was reduced to two categories, one was lawful 
visitors and the other was trespassers. 
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Implied permission is to be dealt with very carefully as well. Examples of implied 
permission could be permission for persons who enter the premises to communicate 
with the occupier unless he precludes them by notice or otherwise. 
? Liability towards a trespasser who dived into a tidal harbor 
In Donoghue v Folkestone Properties Ltd52: - Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, 
Brooke and Laws LJJ: 27 February 2003, the same previous issue was raised in 
different circumstances where an adult trespasser dived into tidal harbour at low tide 
in midwinter and was injured by submerged grid bed. The issue was whether there 
was a duty owed by harbour owners to trespasser under Occupiers' Liability Act 1984, 
s 1(3)(4) 
It was found that a harbour owner owed no duty under the Occupiers' Liability Act 
1984 to a trespasser injured by striking hidden grid piles because the owner as 
occupier had no reasonable grounds to believe that a trespasser would come into the 
vicinity of the danger within s 1(3)(b) of the Act by diving into the harbour late at 
night in midwinter. The Court of Appeal so held, allowing the appeal of the 
defendants, Folkestone Properties Ltd against the judgment of Judge Bowers sitting as 
an additional High Court judge, on 23 September 2002 for the claimant, John Simon 
Donoghue with a finding of 75% contributory negligence.  
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers Mr said that Mr West for the defendants accepted 
that had the claimant been among those whom the defendants knew were accustomed 
to swim in the vicinity of the harbour slipway in the summer, they would in the 
summer have owed a duty to protect him by posting a warning. His appeal was 
founded on s 1(3)(b).  
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He submitted that the duty to offer some protection to a trespasser against a danger 
only extended to the times when an occupier had reasonable grounds to believe that 
the trespasser might be in the vicinity of and at risk from the danger. As there were no 
reasonable grounds to believe that anyone would be swimming near the slipway in the 
middle of the night in midwinter, no duty was owed to the claimant when he had his 
accident.  
In Ratcliff v McConnell53 Stuart-Smith LJ endorsed the proposition that the existence 
of the duty had to be determined by reference to the likelihood of the trespasser's 
presence in the vicinity of the danger at the actual time and place of danger to him. 
Those observations did not support the proposition that, when applying s. 1(3), it was 
appropriate to ask whether a duty was owed to a class. Consideration of a class of 
trespasser might be helpful when approaching the question raised by s 1(3)(b) of 
whether the occupier had reasonable grounds to believe that the trespasser might 
come within the vicinity of the danger.  
It was enough if the trespasser could show that he was one of a class of persons whom 
the occupier had reason to believe might be in the vicinity of the danger. Once, 
however, s 1(3)(b) was satisfied, it became necessary to consider whether any duty 
was owed to the particular member of that class who suffered the injury. In 
Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council54 Ward LJ drew a distinction between the 
approach to s 1(3) as a duty owed to the claimant as a member of a class whereas s 
1(4) focused on the duty to the individual claimant. His Lordship did not consider that 
distinction to be valid. "The other" in s 1(3) was the same person as "another" in s 
1(4), namely the very individual who had sustained the injury.  
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The circumstances material to the existence of a duty might change with the seasons 
or the time of day. At the time the claimant sustained his injuries the defendants had 
no reason to believe that he or anyone else would be swimming from the slipway. 
Brooke LJ delivered a concurring judgment. Laws LJ agreed. 
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? Using an improperly footed ladder: 
In McCook v Lobo55 the claimant, who was employed 
as a general labourer by the third defendant building 
contractor, injured his back when he fell from a ladder 
while carrying out repair and conversion building 
work at premises owned by the first defendant and 
intended for use by the second defendant. In 
proceedings by the claimant for damages for personal 
injuries, the judge concluded, on a preliminary issue 
as to liability, that the claimant was at all times 
employed by the third defendant who had control over 
the work he performed and that the claimant fell off 
the ladder as a result of the third defendant's 
negligence at common law and breach of provisions 
in the Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) 
Regulations 1996.  
The judge also found that the first defendant did not have control over the way the 
claimant carried out his work and so was not in breach of regulation 4(2) of the 1996 
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Regulations; that, on the assumption that the first defendant was in breach of 
regulation 10 of the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 in 
failing to prepare a health and safety plan in respect of the works of conversion, such 
breach was not in any way causative of the claimant's injury and loss; and that there 
was no basis for any claim against the first defendant under the Occupiers' Liability 
Act 1957. The judge accordingly dismissed the claim against the first and second 
defendants, and he gave judgment for the claimant, to the extent of 75%, against the 
third defendant. 
The claimant appealed. 
The Court of Appeal held: (1) It was inappropriate and unnecessary to treat potential 
liability at common law as distinguishable from the common duty of care owed by an 
occupier of premises under the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 unless a distinct 
simultaneous duty also arose, for example, from the relationship of employer and 
employee. On the facts as found, the first defendant's duty to the claimant in 
negligence was confined to compliance with the common duty of care under the 1957 
Act, and such duty, taken at its highest, did not require the first defendant to take 
precautions to see that the ladder from which the claimant fell was footed or secured 
while he was working from it, nor to ensure that the third defendant building 
contractor had given express instructions to the claimant not to use the ladder when it 
was not properly footed, nor to inquire from any other employee of the third 
defendant whether he appreciated the risks of mounting and working from an 
improperly footed ladder. (2) The required control under regulation 4(2) of the 
Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996 was related to control 
over the work of construction, and whether the appropriate level of control was or 
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should be exercised by an individual other than a contractor as employer was a 
question of fact for the judge.  
That question was not answered affirmatively by demonstrating that the individual 
had control over the site in a general sense as an occupier, or that as the occupier he 
was entitled to ask or require a contractor to remove obvious hazards from the site, or 
that he enjoyed power to control the site. A failure to provide an appropriate health 
and safety plan in accordance with regulation 10 of the Construction (Design and 
Management) Regulations 1994 did not create the element of control of a site which 
was the prerequisite to any duty arising under regulation 4(2). Notwithstanding the 
concession made by the first defendant owner that he was in breach of regulation 10, 
given that the third defendant disregarded not only the statutory obligations owed to 
the claimant but the obvious and simple precaution to ensure the claimant would be 
safe when mounted on a ladder, the judge was entitled to conclude that the necessary 
causative link between the first defendant's breach and the claimant's consequent 
injury was not established. The appeal was dismissed. 
? Warning of danger to Invitees: 
Where a damage is caused to the invitee by a danger of which he has been warned by 
the occupier, the warning should not be treated as absolving the occupier from 
liability unless in all circumstances it was enough to enable the visitor to be 
reasonably safe. 
If there is a probability of intrusion by children too young to appreciate the danger or 
understand the warning notice the occupier’s duty may require the provision of an 
obstacle to their approach to the danger sufficiently difficult to surmount as to make it 
clear to the youngest unaccompanied child likely to approach the danger that beyond 
the obstacle is forbidden territory. 
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Pannett v. P. Maguiness & Co. Ltd56 provides an illustration of the application of the 
mentioned principles in English law. The defendants were engaged in the demolition 
of a warehouse, which was close to a public park. At one stage the defendants found it 
necessary to remove the hoardings around the site and light fires. They knew these 
fires would be attractive to children so they posted three men to watch the fires and 
warn off children.  
The plaintiff aged 5 had been warned off by these men but in the afternoon in 
question soon after school hours the men were absent from the site. The plaintiff 
entered the building, fell into a fire and was seriously injured. The court of Appeal 
upheld the decision for the plaintiff. In view of the situation of the warehouse the 
attractiveness of fires to children and the time of the accident there was a serious risk 
of which the defendants were in fact aware and they were responsible for the 
negligence of their servants in failing to exercise proper supervision. The plaintiff was 
aware that he ought not to go into the warehouse but this was not in view of his age 
sufficient protection for he could not fully appreciate the danger of the fires.  
? Dangers hidden by Darkness: 
It is not settled that if an invitee walks in darkness where he cannot see whether there 
is danger or not he does so at his own peril. There is no absolute rule of English law 
that in all cases an invitee moving in the dark takes the risk of any danger, which in 
daylight would be obvious. It has to be shown whether the occupier in the particular 
case must take reasonable care to make the place safe by lighting or otherwise 
eliminate the danger. 
? Employer's visit to the site: 
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It was settled in English law57 that the employer has no implied contractual right to 
enter the site at any time without the contractor's knowledge and to expect to find the 
site ready and safe for his visit. If the employer enters the site without warning and 
without the knowledge of the contractor it seems he does so at his own risk. 
? Theft of Employer's property: 
If the employer leaves his house empty during the performance of the work then it is 
the duty of the contractor to take reasonable care with regard to the status of the 
employer's house. This rule was laid down in the English case Stansbie vs Troman58 
where a decorator left alone in house goes out leaving it with catch of Yale lock 
fastened back. Held he was liable for theft while he was away.   
3. Damages for breach of tortious liability: 
(i)Remoteness  of Damage:  
In English law remoteness of damage is governed by the rule in the case of 
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. V. Morts Dock & Engineering Company Ltd. (The 
Wagon Mound-No.1)59. The defendants negligently allowed oil to escape from 
their ship. The oil spread across the water in the harbour. 
The plaintiffs owned a wharf into which the oil drifted. The plaintiffs were 
undertaking welding work in their wharf and after receiving advice that the oil 
was not inflammable, they continued to weld. The oil did however catch fire and 
the wharf was badly damaged. 
The plaintiffs sued for this damage The Privy Council held that the damage was 
not reasonably foreseeable since at that time it was thought that such oil could not 
catch fire while floating on water. The damage, which occurred, had to be of 
foreseeable type if it was to be recoverable. It was of no assistance to the plaintiffs 
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that the defendants could foresee some damage to the plaintiff’s wharf from, say, 
oil pollution. 
The position in the Sudanese Civil Transactions Act 1984 does not address the issue 
of foresee-ability the way it has been addressed in English law. Section 384 of the 
Civil Transactions Act 1984 deals only with compensation for damage and loss 
although its general wording does not suggest that it applies exclusively to torts. 
According to the Section compensation is due once it can be 
proven that it has arisen from the defendant’s act. The only 
exception here is damage arising out of an unavoidable event. 
The Section reads as follows: 
“The contractor shall pay compensation for any loss or damage arising from his acts 
or work, whether intentional, negligent or otherwise. Compensation shall not be 
payable if such loss or damage is a consequence of an unavoidable event.” 
However this section should be read with reference to section 152 which provides that 
the court shall assess damages in accordance with the damage caused to the injured 
party provided that such damage should be the natural consequence of the harmful 
act. 
Adoption of English law principles by Sudanese courts is uncertain in torts as it has 
been pointed out since 1958 in the case of Khartoum Municipal Council v. Michele 
Cotran60 that the question of damages is a matter to be fixed by local considerations 
but English and other foreign cases should not be taken as guides. 
It is believed that the ruling of the Court of Appeal in the mentioned case should not 
be viewed in isolation from the well-recognized approach of Sudanese courts to 
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English precedents i.e. that Sudanese courts could be guided although not bound by 
English precedents. Such an approach holds the same logic raised by the Court of 
Appeal for the necessity of paying careful attention to local consideration but it 
allows for reasonable guidance when similar issues are identified. 
(ii) Causation: 
In English law the test used to determine causation is the "but for test". In the case of 
Cork v. Curby Maclean Ltd61 Lord Denning remarked as follows: 
“If the damage would not have happened but for a particular fault then that fault is the 
cause of the damage.” 
The statement by Lord Denning was further explained in the case of Barnet v. Chelsea 
and Kensington Hospital Management committee62 where a doctor refused to treat a 
patient and the patient later died. The doctor was found not liable because by the time 
the patient presented himself for treatment he was so ill that no treatment was 
possible. Accordingly it could not be said that but for the doctor’s failure to treat the 
patient he would not have died.  
This rule is important in construction as it can be applied to situations where the 
condition of a particular structure or part of it, for example, is irreparable to the extent 
that its fall or damage is inevitable regardless of any action or omission on the part of 
the defendant. 
The position in Sudanese law can be illustrated by the case of Sudanese Commercial 
Bank vs. Dawood Yousuf63 where the effects of interference by a third party were 
also discussed. The Court, after summing up the facts of the case, held that as a 
general rule the chain of causation between the act committed by the defendant and 
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the damage caused to the plaintiff ceases to exist if the damage caused to the plaintiff 
is a result of a third party’s act and not a direct result of the defendant’s act.  
However, the chain of causation will be affected if the act of another is done 
reasonably as a result of the defendant’s negligence and the consequences of the act 
are not too remote.  
Statutory law in the Sudan is in line with the general rule of causation. The Sudanese 
Civil Transactions Act 1984 Section 5 links liability to causation although it provides 
examples where no liability arises despite proof of causation. The relevant Sub-
sections read as follows: 
 (s) He who does an act directly is liable for it unless even if it is done unintentionally. 
 (t) He who causes an act indirectly is not liable for it unless it is done intentionally. 
 
(iii) Third party contribution to the plaintiff “Insurance”: 
In cases where a plaintiff suffers no actual financial loss because, for example, he is 
insured and an insurance company can make his loss good, he will, still, be entitled to 
substantial damages. 
In Linden gardens Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals64 Lord Justice Staughton 
discussed this issue: 
“When a plaintiff initial loss has subsequently been made good by someone other than 
himself, the general rule is that he can recover only nominal damages. But there are 
certainly exceptions. An obvious example, which occurs every day, is when his 
insurers can compensate a plaintiff; nevertheless he can sue in his own name and 
recover substantial damages, although he may be bound to pay them to his insurers. 
Another example is to be found in the case of Design v. Keniston Housing 
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Association Ltd65. There the loss of the counter-claiming defendants had been or 
would be made good by a grant from the Department of the Environment. It was held 
that the defendants could nevertheless recover substantial damages. 
In the particular case of damage to a building, which is later sold, in my judgment 
there is no rule of law that the damages must necessarily be nominal. If, however, a 
subsequent owner has a claim in his own right in respect of the same damage, the law 
must find some solution to prevent double recovery. 
4. Allegations of irrecoverable loss: 
i) Failure of the plaintiff to mitigate his loss: 
The general rule is that the defendant is liable for the loss, which comes as a 
reasonable and foreseeable result of his act. That general rule is subject to the 
important qualification, which is called the duty to mitigate. 
This duty is applicable to damage, which happens as a result of breach of tortious 
as well as contractual obligations. It has been put by Lord Haldane in British 
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. Underground Electric Railways 
of London66 that: 
"The fundamental basis of the general rule is thus compensation for pecuniary loss 
naturally flowing from the breach; but this first principle is qualified by a second 
which imposes on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the 
loss consequent on the breach and debars him from claiming any part of the 
damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps." 
 
 
ii) Remedial works carried to negligent extent: 
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In case of defects in the building the employer might carry out remedial works upon 
the advice of a consultant and then sue the parties responsible for the defects. If the 
parties challenge the magnitude of the of damages claimed they might argue that the 
plaintiff spent excessive amount on remedial works and it is unreasonable to claim 
such amount against them. The same argument was raised in the case of Board of 
Governors of the Hospital for Sick Children v.Mclaughlin and Harvey plc and 
Others67. 
Judge Newey held that: 
“ The plaintiff who carries out either repair or reinstatement of his property must act 
reasonably. He can only recover as damages the costs, which the defendants ought 
reasonably to have foreseen that he would incur and the defendants would not have 
foreseen unreasonable expenditure. Reasonable costs do not, however, mean the 
minimum amount, which, with hindsight, it could be held would have sufficed. When 
the nature of the repairs is such that the plaintiff can only make them with the 
assistance of expert advice the defendant should have foreseen that he would take 
such advice and be influenced by it.” 
His Honor went on to explain that if the expert advice is negligent, however, that may 
break the chain of causation so that the defendant might not be responsible for the 
cost incurred on negligent advice. 
 
iii) Remedial works that constitute betterment: 
In some cases the plaintiff might carry out remedial works to a higher standard than 
the standard required by the original contract. The position of English law on this 
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point was set out in the case of Richard Roberts Holdings Ltd. and another v. Douglas 
Smith Stimson Partnership and Others68.  
It was explained that if the only practical method of overcoming the breach of duty 
caused by the defendant is to build a higher standard, the plaintiff may recover the 
cost of building to that higher standard, unless the new works are so different as to 
break the chain of causation. 
It has to be borne in mind that such betterment has to be justified in order not to form 
an unlawful enrichment within the ambit of Section 165.1 (Three) of the Civil 
transactions Act 1984. 
5. Quantification of Damages: 
In English law and practice a number of difficulties arise in quantifying a claim 
for damages or a claim under tort and contract. First the plaintiff must show the 
basis on which the damages are recoverable; second he or she must prove the 
precise loss sustained and in doing so he must attribute each item of loss to a 
breach; third; there are difficulties quantifying some types of damage such as 
inconvenience.  
i) Identifying the basis of quantification: 
Michael O'Reilly stated that the decided cases show a range of techniques used by the 
court to determine the measure of damage, which the plaintiff is entitled to recover69. 
If for example an act committed by the defendant causes damage to a particular 
structure it may be appropriate to assess the damage on the basis of the amount that 
the plaintiff’s property is less valuable by reason of the defendant’s act; or 
alternatively it may be appropriate to assess the damage on the basis of the cost to the 
plaintiff to have the work re-executed which the defendant caused to be damaged. 
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The cases show that English courts do not lay down precise rules for computing 
damages. They provide simple principles and it is for the plaintiff to show that his 
method of calculating the damage to which he contends is reasonable. In Radford v. 
Defroberville70 Mr. Justice Oliver said that the starting point for the applicable 
principle was the statement by Baron Parke in Robinson v. Harman71 that the rule of 
common law is that when a party sustains a loss he is so far as money can do it to be 
placed in the same situation with respect to damages to restore him to the situation 
before the occurrence of the damage. 
Mr. Justice Oliver then went on to say that the measure of damage could not be 
determined in the abstract and that the court does not disregard the hopes and 
aspirations or the individual predilections of a particular of the particular plaintiff in 
applying that basic principle.  
ii) Remedying defective work: 
The question of the appropriate method of computing damages for defective work is 
of great importance in construction law. Various bases for calculation may be 
suggested including the diminution of the value of the building and cost of repair.  
Often the building experiences a small diminution in value despite the defective work 
whereas the cost of remedying that work is very costly. On such a case the contractor 
will attempt to have the damages calculated on a diminution basis while the employer 
will seek to recover the cost of the remedial work. 
In comparison to cases of damages in contract we can see that what Lord Cohen 
found in East Ham Borough Council v. Bernard Sunley Ltd72. Lord Cohen referred to 
bases of assessing damages as follows: 
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“The learned editors of Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts 8th edition 1959 
say at page 319 that there are in fact three possible bases for assessing damages 
namely (a) the cost of reinstatement (b) the difference in cost to the builder of the 
actual work done and work specified or (c) the diminution in value of value of the 
work done due to the breach of the contract. They go on saying that there is no doubt 
whenever it is reasonable for the employer to insist upon reinstatement the court will 
treat the measure of reinstatement as the measure of damage.” 
iii) Proving the loss: 
    In some situations in construction the precise cause and effect for each individual 
loss is difficult to establish. The reason for this is obvious for those who are involved 
in the planning of construction work; the interactions and interrelations between 
individual items are complex. 
This complexity may be shown on a very detailed network representation of the 
project. But even this does not allow the precise cause and effect relating to each 
change in the work to be computed  
? Necessity as a Defense to tortious liability:The defense of necessity 
was recognized in Sudanese law in the case of Ahmed Mohammed 
Ahmed Yahya vs. Sudan Oil Seeds Company73 where it was held that 
he who causes damage for the purpose of avoiding a greater damage to 
him or to another person would not be considered in fault but rather 
under a state of necessity. However raising a defense of necessity 
according to the mentioned case does not exempt the person causing 
the damage from compensating the aggrieved party. But assessment of 
damages would not be made according to the general principles of 
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quantification of damage. The court would in such cases assess a 
reasonable and fair compensation. 
Damage would be considered to have been caused under a state of necessity 
according to the following criteria: 
? The person causing the damage must have acted 
under the threat of imminent danger person or 
property. 
? The person causing the damage should not have 
intentionally caused the mentioned danger. 
? The damage being avoided should be greater 
than the damage actually caused. 
6. Conclusion: 
Effects of construction works extend to a number of parties and non-parties. Thus it 
has been shown in this chapter that many torts could arise in the course of 
construction. The construction contract is not the only source of liabilities in 
construction. 
The parties to construction contracts should carefully consider issues of tortious 
liability. The negotiation and drafting of a construction contract requires a profound 
view of all the anticipated events.  
For the sake of risk allocation and proper contract management the precaution to be 
taken by parties to construction contacts are of paramount importance. The parties 
who are able to form a clear understanding of the nature of the project they are 
implementing can better contract for its implementation. Their awareness helps them 
be well prepared for all project eventualities. 
  lxxvii
It is evident that Sudanese precedents as well as statutory law are general in dealing 
with issues of tort. There are so many areas in which Sudanese law still needs more 
clarification with regard to construction. 
. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Joint and Vicarious Liability 
1. Introduction: 
The main features of construction are the large numbers of parties often involved in 
one or more pieces of work. There may be an employer, main contractor, several 
subcontractors each with overlapping responsibilities, numerous consultants each 
interacting with one another and each being a potential contributor to any damage 
which follows, employees acting recklessly while they are in their employers business 
and so on.  
It is therefore a matter of practical importance to see how liability is apportioned 
when damage is caused by more than one person under the control of another. 
2. Vicarious liability in Tort: 
The most common situation where vicarious liability arises is where an employee 
commits a tort; here the employer becomes vicariously liable. The rationale for 
vicarious liability derives from social considerations. A commercial enterprise 
involves  profit and risk. It would not be right to allow the employer to take the profits 
and transfer his risks onto the public. The law provides the plaintiff with a choice. 
They may take action against the employee or the employer and usually choose the 
latter. 
The law recognizes a distinction between employees and independent contractors. 
Independent contractors cannot be controlled by their employer and so no vicarious 
liability attaches to the employer for acts of independent contractors. Accordingly the 
distinction between employees (servants) and independent contractor is an important 
and fundamental one since servants attract vicarious liability for their employees 
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while independent contractors do not. The precise test to be applied in order to 
distinguish between independent contractors and employees is not always clear. 
Lord Denning said in Stevenson Jordan & Harrison v. MacDonald Evans74: 
“The test usually applied is whether the employer has the right to control the manner 
of doing the work. A simple test is suggested: If the employer can only control what is 
done the employee is an independent contractor and his torts do not make the 
employer liable. If however the employer can control the way in which it is to be done 
then the employee is a servant and the employer will be vicariously liable for his torts. 
However the nature of the relationship must depend on all the circumstances and 
control is only one though an extremely important factor, 
An employer does not attract liability to his employer for every negligent act, only 
those which are referable to the employment relationship subsisting between them. 
One problem is to determine whether what is done by an employee, albeit, an 
authorized act is referable to the employment relationship.  
For instance in Whatman v. Pearson75 a contractor allowed his workmen an hour for 
lunch but they were not permitted to go home or leave their horses and carts 
unattended. One workman however went slightly out of his way in order to go home 
for lunch and he left his horse in front of his house. The horse ran off and damaged 
the plaintiff’s property. The question was whether the employer was vicariously liable 
and this turned on whether or not the workman was acting in a way which was 
referable to his employment. The court decided that this was properly left to the jury 
for their decision and that they could justifiably decide that the employer was 
vicariously liable. 
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? Lending an employee: 
Some decided English precedents have considered vicarious liability where an 
employer A lends an employee B to another C. The issue is if B in the course of his 
employment commits a tort against X is it A or C who is vicariously liable to X76. 
In Mersey Docks & Harbours Board v. Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd77. A 
employed B as a driver of a mobile crane and let the crane together with B as driver to 
C. While operating the crane B negligently injured X. The House of Lords held that A 
was vicariously liable for the acts of B. 
From the perspective of the borrower we find that according to the rule in Davies v. 
Collins the contractor can allow others to perform his obligations while remaining 
liable himself78. However some of the exceptions to this are cases where the 
contractor does not have the right of performing by another if either there is a 
prohibition in the contract or there is some personal element in his obligation. 
3. Contractors' Liability for injury to third parties: 
Wallace is of opinion that contractors and sub-contractors, as the persons actually 
carrying out building operations, are clearly liable if negligent to persons injured by 
their operations, or by subsequent failures or accidents in a building after completion 
caused by their negligence79.  
The following cases illustrate different relevant situations: 
? Damage to Adjacent Building caused by Heavy Vibration: 
In Hoare v.MacAlpine80 contractors drove a large number of piles into 
the soil while preparing the site for a large building in the heart of the 
city, and the heavy vibration caused serious damage to an old house 
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belonging to these plaintiffs, who were compelled to demolish a large 
part of it under a dangerous structure notice. The contractors contended 
that the building was exceptionally old and frail, and that this action did 
not therefore constitute a nuisance since a normal building would not 
have suffered damage.  Held, even if the building was in such as 
unusually frail state that nuisance could not be established, the 
defendants were absolutely liable for the damage done by them under 
the rule in Rylands v.  Fletcher.   
? Fireman Electrocuted while attending Fire: 
In Hartley v. Mayoh & Co. and the N.W. Electricity Board81 a fireman 
attending a fire in the first defendant’s factory premises was electrocuted 
and killed.  The cause of his electrocution was: 
First, those absolute tumbler switches, which were in fact the main 
switches, had been left on, although the firemen had switched off all the 
other switches so that no current should have been in the part of the 
building affected by the fire. Secondly, two wires had been transposed 
so that although all the switches except the main switches were off, 
current was still flowing in that part of the building.  The second 
defendants or their predecessors had done work in the building in 1930, 
1946 and 1950, and the transposing of the wires was due to the 
negligence of some employee of the second defendants on a previous 
occasion, which it was impossible to identify.  The fault was one, which 
might have been found if a proper test had been carried out after work 
was done.  The second defendants had not pointed out after work was 
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done.  The second defendants had not pointed out o the first defendants, 
who were the occupiers of the factory, that the main switches were 
obsolete.  It was negligent of the first defendant’s manager not to know 
where the main switch was. 
 Held, the first defendants were 10 percent to blame and the second defendants 
90 percent, to blame, and both were liable in damages for the death of the 
fireman. 
? Obstruction of Access to Neighboring Buildings: 
In Billings v. Riden82. Contractors working on occupied premises obstructed the 
access to the premises, so that visitors to the premises had to make a short 
diversion onto the adjoining premises in order to reach those on which the 
contractor was working.  The adjoining premises were in an unfit and dangerous 
condition and the plaintiff fell and was injured there while on her way home 
after visiting the occupiers of the premises.  Held, by the House of Lords, that 
the fact that the contractor was not in contractual relations with the defendant 
was irrelevant; the duty owed by the contractor was not the same as the duty of 
the owner (whose duty as a licensor, for instance, might be of limited scope and 
voided by proving a plaintiff’s knowledge of the danger, or warning); and, not 
withstanding that the plaintiff was aware of the dangerous condition of the 
adjoining premises, the contractor was liable for failure to use reasonable care to 
prevent danger to persons who might be expected lawfully to visit the house.  
Per Lord Keith, a contractor is not normally liable for a danger not of his own 
creation on adjacent property, with which he has no right to interfere, but if, as 
here, he does not provide a reasonably safe approach to a house he may liable if 
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a person, attempting to enter or leave the house, is precipitated into the danger 
on the adjacent property. 
? Damage caused by a defect in the Building: 
In Gallagher v. McDowell Ltd83. Builders negligently plugged a hole in a 
wooden floor.  The defect was not noticed by the owner, who subsequently let 
the house to the plaintiff’s husband.  The plaintiff was injured when the heel of 
her shoe went through the hole.  Held, by the Court of the Appeal of Northern 
Ireland, that the immunity in relation to real property only applied to vendors or 
landlords property, and that the builders owed a duty in tort to all lawful users 
of the house they had constructed. 
? Injury caused by lack of support to a wall: 
In Clayton v.  Woodman & Sons (Builders) Ltd84. an Architect administering a 
contract was advised by an experienced bricklayer that it would be better to pull 
down an existing wall which was intended to be used in the works if it was 
sufficiently strong.  The architect satisfied himself that the wall was adequate 
for its intended function, and decided not to change the original intention.  The 
bricklayer was injured when the work was carried out without support being 
arranged for the wall.  The contractor was required by the specification to 
provide all necessary shoring and support.  Held, by the court of Appeal, that 
the architect did not in the circumstances owe any duty to the workman.  To do 
more whether by advice or warning would be to step out of his own province 
into that of the builder.  Had he ordered the work to be carried out without 
support that would have been a different situation, but all he had done, as he 
was entitled to do, was to refuse to alter the contract. 
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? Damage caused by the collapse of a stage: 
In Voli v. Inglewood Shire Council85 the plaintiff attended a meeting at a public 
hall, and was injured when the stage collapsed.  He sued both the architect and 
the owners of the hall, who had hired it out t the association giving the meeting.  
The design of the floor joists and stage was defective.  Under the architect’s 
contracts of employment all his plans and specifications were subject to the 
inspection and approval of his employers’ public works department.  Held, by 
the High Court of Australia, that (1) the architect was independently liable in 
tort for failing to design a stage capable of bearing the number of people likely 
to assemble thee; (2) nothing in the contract of employment of the architect 
could affect his liability to third persons; and (3) the owners were also 
vicariously liable for the architect’s negligence, the immunity of landlords (if 
there was indeed a letting) not extending to persons letting out property for 
public purposes. 
 
? Demolition Workers Leaving a wall in Dangerous Condition: 
In Clay v. A.J.Crump Ltd86. prior to entry on the site by main contractors, an 
architect, after a telephone discussion with the demolition contractors who had 
cleared the site, approved of their leaving an existing wall standing on the site 
without support in a dangerous condition.  The architect had accepted the 
opinion of the demolition contractors that it was safe, and though he 
subsequently visited the site and had an opportunity to do so, did not in fact 
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examine the wall carefully.  The building contractors did not do so either, but 
assumed that the architect had satisfied himself a bout its safety.  A workman of 
the building contractors was injured when the wall collapsed.  Held, by the 
Court of Appeal, that the architect, the demolition contractors and the building 
contractors were all liable to the workman. 
? Workman injured by collapse of Concrete: 
In Florida Hotels Ltd. v. Mayo87 an Architect was employed under RAIA terms 
of engagement (similar to those of the RIBA), which included “periodical 
supervision and inspection as may be necessary to ensure the works generally 
are executed in accordance with the contract:  constant supervision does not 
form part of the duties undertaken…” The building owner in fact employed no 
main contractor, using his own foreman and leading hands to supervise the 
work, which included a concrete swimming pool, in conjunction with the 
architect.  The architect visited twice a week, including a Friday at a time when 
the reinforcement for the concrete aprons of the pool was not yet fixed.  After 
the visit, the mesh reinforcement was placed longitudinally instead of 
transversely.  By the next visit the concrete had been poured.  When the form 
work was struck, the concrete collapsed and injured a workman.  The building 
owner when sued joined the architect as a third party.  Held, by the High Court 
of Australia (Windever J.dissenting), that the architect’s obligation was to 
inspect form work and reinforcement before pouring and not to assume that the 
foreman would postpone pouring of concrete till the next inspection.  He should 
have given clear and express instructions to the foreman that concrete should 
not be poured until the architect had been notified and had inspected:   
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? Damage caused by a hole in the Roof: 
In McArdle v. Andmac Roofing88 holiday camp proprietors P. had a building 
and maintenance subsidiary which employed N., “labour-only” contractors, to 
fix joists and boards on a roof to receive the felt of A.. Specialist roofing 
contractors.  One of the “labour-only” employees left a hole in the roof 
unguarded before going to lunch, and an employee of the roofers fell from the 
roof and was injured.  He sued P. ‘s subsidiary, his own employers A.. and N. 
No special arrangements about safety had been made by anyone.  Held, by the 
Court of Appeal, that as P. was employing two small contractors who were to 
work in proximity and one of whom was “labour-only”.  P. had assumed the 
duty of co-coordinating the work and was under a duty to see that reasonable 
safety precautions were taken. P., N. and A. were all liable, and as between each 
other were each one-third liable.  
A slightly similar Sudanese case was Ali El Hag Mansoor V. El Hag Ahmed 
Abu Zeid And Mohamed Tewfik Hussein89, which recognized the duty of the 
employer to see that reasonable safety precautions were taken. However, that 
case was decided on different grounds because the issue in question was 
whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim damages despite his signature of a 
settlement of claim of compensation. 
The facts were as follows; Plaintiff was employed by defendants as a carpenter to help 
in the fitting of the roof of a building under construction for the Sudan Army 
Engineering Corps in Omdurman. On May 26, 1958, whilst working on a part of the 
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roof that was still under construction, he tried to cross to the other side of the roof; but 
he stepped onto an asbestos sheet, which collapsed, and he fell to the ground below, 
and sustained a fracture to his ankle. 
On July 30. 1958. Plaintiff wrote and signed a document whereby he agreed to accept 
£S.32.500m/ms as compensation for his injury in full and final settlement and he later 
signed a receipt re-affirming the contract. Plaintiff was literate, but did not seek legal 
advice before entering into the agreement. In 1959 plaintiff brought an action 
claiming damages on the grounds that his personal injuries were caused by the 
negligence of the defendants. 
Held: The plaintiff was aware of the contents of the document and under stood them. 
Accordingly plaintiff was not entitled to recover any damages from the defendants 
because he accepted a full and final settlement of his claim. 
? Demolishing a Neighboring House: 
In Old school v. Gleeson90 Owners demolishing two houses before developing 
them became liable under a party wall award for damage done to a third house.  
Their contractors admitted liability, but sued the owner’s consulting engineers, 
alleging a duty to supervise and negligent design.  Held, by Sir William Stabb 
Q.C., following Clayton v. Woodman and distinguishing Clay v. Crump, that 
the claim. Per Judge Stabb, the duty of care in no way extended into the area of 
how the work was carried out.  There was no duty to instruct the builder how to 
do the work, nor to detect faults during the progress of the work onto the 
engineer on the ground that he failed to intervene to prevent damage to 
adjoining property.  As to the design, only if a design was so faulty that a 
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competent contractor could not have avoided the resulting damage by taking all 
possible precautions should the engineer in principle be liable. 
 
? Negligence by a tree felling Contractor: 
In Salisbury v. Woodland91 the occupier of a house adjoining a highway 
engaged an apparently competent tree-felling contractor to remove a tree in his 
front garden.  The contractor negligently damaged telephone wires, which fell 
across the highway, and passer-by was injured by a car running into him.  Held, 
by the Court of Appeal, that since the work was neither of an inherently 
dangerous nature nor carried out n the highway itself, the case did not come 
within any of the recognized exceptions to the independent contractor rule, and 
the occupier was not liable.  
? Liability of Bailor or lender of Chattel: 
In Wheeler v. Copas (1981)92 a farmer engaged a firm of bricklayers to do work 
and undertook to provide equipment, he provided a farm ladder to carry up 
materials and one of the partners was injured when it collapsed.  held, by 
chapman J., that while not liable under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, since 
the ladder was no longer under the farmer’s control and had been taken over by 
the contractors, he owed a duty of care either as a bailer or lender of a chattel or 
as an occupier of property who intended others to come and use appliances 
supplied by him.  
? Superintendence of the Scaffolding: 
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In Kealey v. Heard93 a developer/converter of property engaged specialist 
tradesmen individually and had scaffolding erected by one of them.  Some 
unknown person had placed planks on the scaffolding which collapsed, injuring 
a self-employed plasterer. Held, by Mann J., since the developer had not 
engaged anyone to superintend the scaffolding, he was liable in negligence for 
failure to exercise proper care and control over the building appliances he had 
supplied.    
? Dangerous Internal Glass Panel: 
In Rimmer v. Liverpool City Council94. a local authority designed and built 
premises for letting with an internal glass panel which was dangerous because it 
was too thin.  A tenant who had been injured when falling against it sued in 
negligence.  Held, by the Court of Appeal, that the local authority were not, by 
reason of limitation, liable under section 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972, 
nor under section 4 (1) of that Act, since it was not a case of breach of a 
repairing obligation.   
? Negligent Plastering by sub-contractor: 
In D. & F. Estates v. Church Commissioners for England95 a plastering sub 
contractors on a large luxury development introduced an unspecified coat of 
browning plaster balanced by a thinner coat of bonding plaster.  The main 
contractors’ supervisors must have known of this and that it was a breach of 
manufacturers’ introductions.  There were widespread falls of plaster in the 
development, and a subsequently flat owner sued the main contractors for the 
cost of repairs.  Held, by the Court of Appeal (and affirmed, although obiter, by 
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he House of Lords, who held there was no liability in any event).  The main 
contractors were not liable for the negligence of the sub contractors. 
? Demolished Building Constituting Danger to Neighboring Buildings: 
In Smith v. Littlewoods Ltd96. developers partly demolished a cinema prior to its 
redevelopment, and left it unattended before commencing construction.  
Children broke in and were seen to make fires in and near it, but this was not 
reported to the police or the developers.  Eventually children or teenagers 
deliberately set fire to it and seriously damaged adjoining property, whose 
owners sued the developers.  Held, by the House of Lords, that this was not an 
obvious fire risk, and since the previous acts of vandalism were not known they 
were not liable.  Per Lord Brandon, the owners general duty was to exercise 
reasonable care to ensure the building did not become a source of danger to 
neighboring buildings. Whether that extended to prevent young persons 
obtaining unlawful access and setting fire to it must depend on whether the 
behavior was reasonably foreseeable.  
Sudanese law has dealt with strict liability of the 
employer in the case of Butros Yousuf v. Malwal Akom 
Bom97. The facts and the findings in that case are as 
follows: The defendants (appellants) are proprietors of 
a tiles factory. The plaintiff (respondent) was engaged 
in the factory as a manual laborer early February 1974. 
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On the 28th of the same month and in accordance with 
instructions to that effect the plaintiff took over the 
duty of operating the tiles production machine, which 
was electrically propelled. The machine was 
composed of dangerous parts. On 2.3.1974 while the 
plaintiff was carrying on his duty the glove he was 
wearing was caught by a nail protruding from the 
wheel of the machine thereby pushing the plaintiff’s 
left hand towards the wheel ultimately leading to the 
amputation of the hand at just above the joint of the 
wrist. This resulted in a permanent disability medically 
assessed at 70%. 
Held: 
? Employer’s liability for injuries sustained by a 
workman in the course of employment in a 
dangerous machine is strict. 
? Employing a workman without instruction or 
training in a machine some parts of which are 
dangerous is tantamount to negligence whereby 
the employer renders himself liable for any 
injuries thereby suffered by the workman in 
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pursuance of the general principles of liability in 
tort. 
The machine referred to in the case was a dangerous one but can only be an example 
of the different types of machines and tools used in construction activities. But it 
would not be easy in all cases to provide a fixed definition of what a dangerous 
machine is, given that the modern construction technology is coming up with more 
and more mechanization for the swift and effective performance of construction jobs. 
Although not referred to in the precedent, tools can also be as dangerous as machines 
if not used properly. 
The extent of training and instructions to the worker as a means for avoiding strict 
liability of the owner was not elaborated upon in the precedent but it added an 
important exit for the employer for the purpose of avoiding strict liability according to 
the mentioned precedent. 
The rule in the precedent needs to be viewed in line with The Work Injuries 
Compensation Act 1981. Section 10 (2) of the Act provides that An injured workman 
shall not be entitled to any compensation under for any work injuries arising out of 
gross and willful misconduct on the part of such workman, unless such injury leads to 
death or results in disability not less than 40%.   
Gross negligence or contributory negligence were not at issue in the precedent so was 
the issue of selection to sue in tort or under the Workmen Compensation Ordinance, 
1949 which was in force at he time of the precedent. 
4. Liability for the acts of Independent contractors: 
The general rule in English law is that an employer is not liable for the acts of an 
independent contractor in the same way as he is for the acts of his servant. In 
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Honeywell and Stein Ltd. V. Larkin (London Commercial Photographers) Ltd98 Lord 
Justice Slesser said: 
“It is well established as a general rule of English law that the employer is not liable 
for the acts of his independent contractor in the same way as he is for the acts of his 
servants or agents even though these acts are done in carrying out work for his benefit 
under the contract.” However there are a number of important exceptions. 
Whenever an employer authorizes the independent contractor to commit a tort the 
employer cannot avoid liability for it because he has in effect acted in concert with the 
contractor. Thus in Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co.99 the defendant gas authority 
had authorized a contractor to make excavations on the street the result of which was 
a spoil heap. The plaintiff fell over this and was injured. The defendants were liable, 
as they had authorized the nuisance. 
There are a number of situations where the law characterizes the employer’s duty as 
non-delegable in which case the employment of an independent contractor no matter 
how reputable or skilled will not enable the employer to avoid his liability. There 
appears to be no consistent rule about which type of activities might be so 
characterized. Duties, which have been held, to be non-delegable include the 
employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace for their employees. There is also a class 
of such duties classified under the head of hazardous activities. In Salisbury v. 
Woodland 100 Lord Justice Widgery said that an employer was not liable simply 
because the work was hazardous it has to be attended by some special hazard such as 
that an employer could not reasonably avoid his liability by employing an 
independent contractor. Examples which are of relevance to the construction industry 
and which have been held to be attended by special hazards include working on the 
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high way. Holliday v. National Telephone Co.101 and grounds works adjacent to a 
neighboring property, which threaten to undermine its foundations Angus v. Dalton102 
or work such as metal welding which may cause fire Honeywell and Stein Ltd. V. 
Larkin Brothers (London Commercial Photographers) Ltd103.  
Sudanese law adopted this same standing since 1959. In the Sudanese precedent, 
Hassan Abu Mirein vs. Mukhtar Nurein104 It was held that an employer is liable for 
the torts of his independent contractor when the injury arises from the doing of the 
very thing, which he has delegated, to the contractor. 
M.A. Abu Rannat CJ stated the following: 
“ The facts of this case are quite simple and I shall set them out here:_ The plaintiff 
was occupying shop No. 46 Bloch 20 in Omdurman Market which is adjoining 
defendant’s shop . On 20th January 1958 the defendant made an agreement with a 
independent contractor to pull down and rebuild six shops one of which was adjoining 
the shop occupied by the plaintiff. While the contractor was digging the foundation of 
the adjoining shop the partition wall of the shop occupied by the plaintiff fell down 
and the plaintiff was compelled to remove his goods from the shop. The plaintiff 
claimed that some of his goods were damaged and claimed the value of the damaged 
goods and loss of profit during the period he was unable to occupy his shop. 
The defendant denied liability on the grounds that he delegated the work to an 
independent contractor who was fit and qualified for the performance of such work 
and that proper instructions were given to him to avoid the dangers incidental to the 
work. The defendant refers to the passage contained in the contract between him and 
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the independent contractor which reads: “The contractor shall be fully responsible for 
any damage that may be caused to the buildings of the neighbours”. 
I think it has been settled law that the occupier of property cannot escape liability by 
the mere employment of another: 
a) When the work he imposes on another is illegal. 
b) When the injury arises from the doing of the very thing which he has 
delegated. 
c) When the thing to be done arises out of a statutory duty or public 
authority. 
d) When the thing to be done is necessarily dangerous.  
It appears to me that condition b applies to the facts of this case and in support of this 
view. I refer to a passage in the judgment of Lord Blackburn in Dalton vs, Angus105.  
He said at page 829:_”a person causes something to be done the doing of which casts 
upon him a duty cannot escape from the responsibility attaching on him on seeing that 
duty performed by delegating it to a contractor. He may bargain with the contractor 
that he shall perform the duty and stipulate for an indemnity from him if it is not 
performed but he cannot thereby relieve himself from liability for those injured by the 
failure to perform it.” 
The leading authority for the liability for an employer who employs an independent 
contractor who interferes with support accorded to land or buildings is Bower vs. 
Peate106. In that case the defendant employed a contractor to pull down his house and 
in the course of the operations damage was caused to the plaintiff’s house owing to 
the inadequacy of temporary support. Cockburn CJ at page 326 said: - 
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“ The answer to the defendant’s contention may however as it appears to us be placed 
on a broader ground namely that a man who orders a work to be executed from which 
in the natural course of things injurious consequences to his neighbour may be 
expected to arise unless means are adopted by which such consequences may be 
prevented is bound to see to the doing of that thing which is necessary to prevent the 
mischief and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing someone else_ 
whether it be the contractor to do the work from which this danger arises or some 
independent person to do what is necessary to prevent the act which he has ordered 
from becoming wrongful.” 
In our view the defendant is liable for damage caused to the plaintiff’s property and 
he cannot escape liability by delegating the work to an independent contractor, we 
also approve of the principle contained in Hamza Ali Kameir vs. Mohammed Hassan 
Al Sawahli which is reported on page 74 of the Sudan Law Journal and Reports 
1956." 
 
5. Vicarious Liability and Independent Contracts: 
In tort a defendant without personal negligence will be vicariously liable for the 
negligent acts or omissions of his servants while acting within the scope of their 
employment, the general rule is that he will not be vicariously liable in this way for 
those of an independent contractor agent while the latter is performing his contract.   
There are, however, a number of cases where this is not so, and where the employer 
of the independent contractor will nevertheless be liable in tort.   
The following cases provided in Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts page 
235 illustrate a few example of the issue: 
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? Independent Contractor Building on Inadequate 
Foundation: 
In Mount Albert Borough v. Johnson107 a developer who was also a builder 
acquired land and sub-divided it into plots and then built upon it, engaging a 
partnership, which he did not himself join, as his builders.  There was a close 
relationship at all times between him and the partners.  A house was built on 
inadequate foundations, which were in breach of the by-law, and the owner sued 
the developer, the builders and the local authority for the cost of repairs under 
the Anns principal.  Held, by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, that there 
was a duty of care to avoid economic loss owed to subsequent occupiers under 
the Anns principal, and the developer could be treated as jointly liable in 
negligence with the building partnership, but additionally the duty of care owed 
by him was in any event non-delegable to an independent contractor such as the 
building partnership.  
? Independent Contractor Departing from Manufacturer's 
Specification: 
In D. & F. Estates v. Church Commissioners108 main contractors for a large 
luxury flat development engaged a small firm of self-employed plasterers.  The 
plasters deliberately departed from manufacturers’ instructions by inserting an 
additional coat of browning plaster, and some years later plaster fell and large 
areas of dangerous hollow plaster were also found.  The flat owners sued the 
main contractor for the cost of repairs under the Anns principle.  There was a 
finding that the main contractors’ supervisors ought to have known that there 
had been a departure from the specification.  The plasters were not worth suing, 
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and the flat owners sued the main contractor.  Held, by the House of Lords, 
affirming the Court of Appeal and not following the Mount Albert case, that in 
the absence of knowledge of the specification departure, the main contractors 
were not liable.  
? Negligent Interference with Joint roof: 
In Alcock v.Wraith109 the plaintiff and the defendants lived in adjoining terraced 
houses.  The defendants engaged a contractor to re-roof their houses, where 
their new tiles would overlap with the plaintiff’s roof.  Later damp appeared in 
the plaintiff’s house due to some of the slates on his roof being removed and the 
joint between his slates and the new tiles being inadequately made.  After the 
contractor had become bankrupt the plaintiff sued the defendants for the cost of 
remedial work.  Held, by the Court of Appeal, that although the defendants had 
the right to interfere with the joint between the two roofs and to intrude slightly 
on their neighbor’s roof, they must exercise reasonable skill and care in so 
doing, and this duty could not be delegated to an independent contractor, since 
the work involved a risk of damage to that property. 
6. Joint Liability of Contractor and Engineer:   
Sudanese law deals with joint liability in section 151 of the Civil Transactions Act 
1984. According to section 151 when two or more persons have committed a harmful 
act, they shall all be jointly liable for the payment of compensation for the harm. Joint 
tort-feasors shall be equally liable unless the Court fixes the respective share of each 
of them in the compensation. 
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Sudanese Law holds the contractor and the engineer jointly liable for any damage to 
the property when in case the engineer designs the works and supervises its execution 
by the contractor. Section 385 of the Act reads as follows: 
“If the contact provides for the acceptance by the employer of a building design by an 
engineer to be executed by a contractor under the supervision of the engineer, the 
engineer and the contractor shall be jointly liable to compensate the client for any 
total or partial destruction in any buildings they execute or structure they erect or any 
defect endangering the safety and integrity of the building, such liability to remain for 
10 (ten) years, unless the agreement provides for a longer period. 
(1) The said liability for compensation shall remain notwithstanding that the 
defect or destruction arises as a result of a defect in the soil itself or the 
acceptance by the client of executing the defective structures.  
(2) The period of ten years provided for in sub-section (1) shall commence for the 
date of the acceptance.”   
  c
Other examples of statutory duties relating to 
construction in the Civil Transactions Act 1984 can be 
seen in section 595 and 596 which deal with 
dangerous drainage and roofs. According to the 
section 595 drainages shall not be constructed to flow 
water in the land of another without his permission. 
The section reads as follows:  
(1) Dangerous drainage shall not be made on the land of others or on a public or 
private road and the injury shall be abated even if it was ancient. 
(2) The owners of new constructions shall not discharge their drainage water on 
the land of another without his permission. 
Construction of roofs is also dealt with by section 596 in the following context: 
“ (1) The owner of an immovable property shall construct his roof in a manner which 
causes rain water to drain into his own land or into the public road subject to laws, 
regulations and custom. 
(2) He shall not discharge such water into the land of others.” 
Unlike English law the position of the Civil Transactions Act 1984 seems to be either 
not explicit or does not recognize at all the distinction between joint and several 
tortfeasors.  
English common law distinguishes between joint tortfeasors and several tortfeasors. 
In English Law persons are said to be joint tortfeasors when their separate shares are 
in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a common design. The 
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defendants were found to be joint tort feasors in Brooke v. Bool110, where two men 
searching for a gas leak each applied a naked light to a gas pipe in turn and one of 
them caused an explosion. They were held to be joint tortfeasors.  
But when two ships collided because of the independent acts of negligence of each of 
them and one of them without further negligence collided with a third it was held that 
they were several tortfeasors whose acts combined to produce a single harm because 
there was no community of design.   
8. Conclusion: 
In this Chapter the importance of vicarious liability in construction has been discussed 
and illustrated. Special stress was laid on the fact that all the acts committed during 
the course of construction are usually acts of employees or contractors.  
The distinction between liability for acts by employees and independent contractors 
was drawn bearing in mind that there are conditions, which must be seen before we 
can decide that an independent contractor is really independent.  
The rules which govern joint liability were discussed showing the position in 
Sudanese law with examples laid down in the Civil Transactions Act 1984. It has 
been found there, still, is a great need for more elaboration in Sudanese law regarding 
the subject matter of this chapter.   
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Chapter 4 
Findings and Recommendations 
 
It has been found that there is no classification or definition of a construction contract 
in the Sudanese to provide for application of special rules to such contracts. The only 
related provision in this respect can be found in The Civil Transaction Act 1984 Part 
XII, which deals to a limited and insufficient extent with Contracts of Works and 
Civil Engineering Contracts in section 378. Nevertheless the section does not lay clear 
rules to govern the special nature of construction contracts. 
Sudanese courts have thus far applied the general rules of negligence to some recent 
cases of construction but no elaboration has ever been made on the sophisticated 
requirements of liability for negligence in construction. 
Although it is well understood that the nature of Sudanese society up to very recent 
times might not have allowed for the emergence of similar complaints as those we 
could see in English precedents but nevertheless no particular legal literature has been 
made available to clarify the rules governing nuisance in the Sudan. 
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Reported cases as well as legislation related to trespass in Sudanese law do not 
adequately cover all aspects of construction due to the fact that most trespass cases in 
the Sudan arose in relation to possession of land and not to construction works. 
No specific precedents or rules are available with regard to the tort of interference in 
the Sudan. Cases which would have otherwise been handled under the tort of 
interference had presumably been inadequately dealt with under other branches of 
criminal and civil laws. 
The extent to which breach of statutory duty could constitute a tort under Sudanese 
law has not been given enough judicial and statutory clarification. It has even been 
found that the position under the Civil transactions Act 1984 section 162 does not 
provide sufficient basis for handling potential cases under this tort. 
It has been found that the liability for dangerous structures is not clear under Sudanese 
law. Even in the cases which could have given rise to such liability little was said in 
this regard. 
The position in the Sudanese Civil Transactions Act 1984 does not address the issue 
of foresee-ability of damage the way it has been addressed in English law. 
According to the present position of Sudanese law it is not clear whether or not 
betterment in remedial works fall under the ambit of Section 165 (1) of the Civil 
Transactions Act 1984 for unlawful enrichment  
There is no distinction between joint and several tort-feasors in the Civil Transaction 
Act 1984. The reported cases do not include or illustrate such a distinction. 
Based on the aforementioned findings recommendations will be dawn for reform of 
Sudanese law in the area of construction. At the inception it is recommended that a  
definition of a construction contract be introduced in order to provide for its special 
nature specially in regarding tortious liability. 
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Due to the great bulk of negligence issues in construction cases it is recommended 
that the legislator, the courts as well as academic writers are called upon to address 
the sophisticated requirements of liability for negligence in construction. 
It is conceivable that with the rapid development of Sudanese society and economy 
courts and legislators should recognize the need to elaborate upon the rules governing 
nuisance. The examples in English law as well as the approach adopted by other cases 
need not necessarily be followed. No doubt great attention should be paid to the 
uniqueness and the reality of the Sudanese society in this respect. 
Due to the fact that most trespass cases in the Sudan arise in relation to possession of 
land and not in construction there should be much care in applying those rules to 
construction works. Special reference is made to section 609 of the Civil Transactions 
Act 1984 which empowers Sudanese courts to consider transferring the ownership of 
the occupied portion to the trespasser on payment of just consideration. The crucial 
issue is that when the assessment of trespass is being made according to the 
mentioned section the value of the structures on it should be carefully considered. 
It is recommended that the position of the Sudanese law be clarified with regard to the 
tort of interference in the Sudan. Due to rarity of such cases in the Sudan relevant 
examples in English law can be used for guidance.  
Judicial and statutory clarifications are required to show the extent to which breach of 
statutory duty could constitute a tort under Sudanese law. It is further recommended 
that section 162 of the Civil Transactions Act 1984 should be amended in order to 
provide sufficient basis for handling potential cases under this tort.  
It is highly recommended that the liability for dangerous structures be defined and 
clarified by more legislative, judicial and academic input. The rules adopted by 
English law could provide good guidance and foundation for such attempt. 
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It is recommended that the Civil Transactions Act 1984 should be amended in order to 
address the issue of foresee-ability of damage the way it has been. Forseeabiliy forms 
an essential part of the general rules governing damage which have a great impact on 
construction. Better explanation of the quantification of damages, should also be 
made. 
Section 165 (1) of the Civil Transactions Act 1984 should be amended in order to 
provide exceptions for cases under which betterment in remedial works could be 
acceptable and be excepted from the meaning of unlawful enrichment under the 
section.  
It is important to create a distinction between joint and several tort-feasors in 
Sudanese law. The existence of this distinction is an important factor in defining 
specific liabilities in construction cases. 
The architect’s liability regarding supervision of work should be defined farther than 
the extent of section 387 of the Civil transactions Act 1984. The trend in the English 
and other cases can be very useful if adopted to qualify the reform and application of 
the mentioned article. 
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